60 SEPTEMBER 2019 ÇPlane&Pilot
A
s we go through life, there’s a presumption that people
who are more experienced and have had more training
are better qualified to make the right decisions and
do the right things. Except, that’s not always true. People
who are more experienced and have had more training
often can be just as mistaken in their decision-making
and require as much help as novices. It took years for that
notion to work its way onto the airline flight deck so that
first officers who knew the captain was doing something
wrong could freely speak up. In fact, sometimes a host of
experience and training can give a person a sense of bravado
and invulnerability. In that case, accidents are just waiting
to happen, and one of them did on March 4, 2017.
The accident location was Duette, Florida. The airplane
involved was a 1977 Beech B60 Duke. The six-seat, twin-
engine airplane was being used on an instructional flight.
It cruised at about 178 knots and had a maximum takeoff
weight of 6,775 pounds and a service ceiling of 30,000 feet.
Power came from two Lycoming TIO-541-E1C4 engines,
each rated at 380 horsepower. It had come out of annual
inspection just two days before the accident and had just
over 3,271 hours when it got the signoff.
There were two people on board, and both were killed
in the accident. One was a private pilot who had recently
bought the airplane, and the other was a flight instructor.
The private pilot, age 58, was rated for single-engine and
multi-engine land airplanes. He didn’t have an instrument
rating. He held a second-class FAA medical certificate that
had been issued on April 4, 2016. On an application for
airplane insurance just over a month before the accident,
he reported having 1,120 total flight hours with 800 in
multi-engine aircraft, including 200 in Beech B60 airplanes.
The insurance company required the pilot to have
biennial ground and flight training. Because the B60 was a
fairly new purchase, the pilot arranged training through a
company that maintained a directory of flight instructors
who specialized in various airplanes. The instructors acted
as independent contractors for the company. They weren’t
trained or evaluated by the company and were required to
maintain their currency and qualifications on their own.
The company didn’t provide flight training manuals for
the instructors but did specify that the instructors had to
follow FAA Practical Test Standards or a specific aircraftflight manual, whichever was more restrictive.
The NTSB reported that the instructor, age 90, held a
commercial certificate and was rated for multi-engine
land and single-engine land and sea airplanes. He had an
instrument rating and also was rated for gliders. His instruc-
tor ratings were good for single-engine, multi-engine and
instruments. He last received an FAA second-class medical
certificate on October 6, 2014. A company profile sheet for
him showed a total time of 20,900 hours with 9,355 in multi-
engine aircraft and 18,900 hours of dual instruction given.
It showed that he had 165 hours in Beech Duke airplanes.
It also showed that he was an airframe and powerplant
mechanic. The profile sheet gave some of his aviation back-
ground, which included owning a flight training school in
the 1970s and subsequently working for a major flight train-
ing school in Florida for about 10 years. During that time,
he was the chief pilot, an instructor and FAA-designated
examiner. Following that, he went to work for a general
aviation airplane manufacturer in Florida, where he was
a flight instructor for one of its models and co-developed
the training program for the product line. After that, he
worked for other flight schools, including being the chief
pilot for an airline’s training program at one of the schools.
In 2011, he became a contract instructor for the company
through which he was working with the owner of the Duke.
At about 12:40 p.m., the airplane took off from Sarasota-
Bradenton International Airport (KSRQ) in visual meteo-
rological conditions. This was the second day the pilot was
receiving instruction. There was no flight plan filed for the
local flight, but it was given flight following services. About
10 minutes after departure, the pilot canceled flight follow-
ing, and for the next 30 minutes FAA radar showed airwork
being performed over a rural area northeast of the airport.
Numerous 360-degree left and right turns, along with figure-
eights, were shown on radar. Just before the airplane was
lost from radar, it had been maneuvering between 1,000
and 1,200 feet MSL in the vicinity of the accident site. The
airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and impacted
trees and the ground, and burst into flames.
Investigators interviewed a witness who saw the air-
plane in straight and level flight, going “kind of slow,” with
the nose gradually pitching up. Using a model airplane, he
showed the airplane falling off on one wing and entering a
spiraling descent. He said the engines sounded smooth and
continuous, but the engine sound increased throughout the
descent. Two other members of the witness’s family gave
nearly identical statements to investigators.
Another witness, who was in a group riding motorcycles,
saw the airplane make a slow roll. He said that at first he
thought the airplane was a crop duster. Others in the group
watched the airplane depart straight and level flight and
enter a near-vertical spiraling descent. They couldn’t hearWhen Instruction
Turns Deadly
A pilot voiced concerns over his CFI’s
methods. Concern wasn’t enough.AFTER THE ACCIDENT
By Peter Katz