Bloomberg Businessweek - USA (2019-12-23)

Aviation

B U S I N E S S

1

14

Edited by

James E. Ellis

● ChangestoBoeing’straining

regimenmayhaveleftpilots

unpreparedtohandlethejet’s

flawedcontrols

OnanovercastFridayinJanuary2016,thousands

ofemployeesgatheredoutsidethe 737 jetlinerfac-

toryina Seattlesuburbforthefirstflightofthe

Max,thenewestversionofBoeingCo.’s50-year-old

workhorse.Thousandsmorewatcheda livefeed

attheirdesks.TwoofBoeing’sacetestpilotssatat

thecontrols,oneanex-U.S.AirForcefighterjock,

theothera Navyveteranwho’dalsoflownexperi-

mentalplanesforNASA. Asthepilotsfiredupthe

firstengine,thehulkingplanerolledforwardsev-

eralfeet—they’dforgottentosettheparkingbrake.

InsidethefraternityofBoeingpilots,itwas

aneyebrow-raisingmomentthatlater,afterthe

uneventfulflightlandedtocheers,ledtosometeas-

ingofthecrackduo,EdWilsonandCraigBomben,

formissingoneofthestepsinthepreflight checklist.

More than an ironic footnote in the Max saga,

the incident is a window into the prideful cul-

ture that led to two crashes and 346  deaths, a

worldwidegroundingofBoeing’smarqueejet,

andunprecedentedscrutinyofthestoriedplane-

maker’s processes. Aviation authorities have

weighed in on how Boeing engineers failed to

anticipate pilots’ reactions to a cacophony of alerts

from misfiring flight control software, how manag-

ers pressured engineers to speed the completion

of their designs, and how an acquiescent Federal

Aviation Administration missed the deadly risk

from software changes made late in testing.

But the most fundamental breakdown at Boeing

may have been a lack of appreciation of how humans

respond under stress—both in the machine it was

designing and in its own organization. On aircraft

like the Boeing 777, a cadre of pilots had worked

closelywithengineerstosolveproblems.Bythetime

theMaxentereddevelopment,Boeingwaspushing

hardtoturntheunglamorousbutall-important busi-

ness of customer training into a profit center of its

own. Many pilots were distracted by a dispute with

Boeing over the hiring of outside contractors. They

contended the quality of training was slipping.

In 2013, a year after a vote that more than dou-

bled the number of unionized pilots, the company

announced that it was moving its Seattle-area flight

simulators to Miami. There and in cities such as JOE RAEDLE/GETTY IMAGES, DATA: TEAL GROUP

Where t e

Went Off

73 7 Max