A prototype of
SLAM’s nuclear
ramjet engine.
L
AST SUMMER, A SMALL
nuclear reactor exploded
on a military testing site
in Russia, killing seven
people and causing a
brief spike in radioac-
tivity in two nearby
cities. Even now, the details are
still scarce; Russia’s nuclear
agency blamed tests concern-
ing “isotopic sources of fuel on a
liquid propulsion unit.” But evi-
dence suggests the mysterious
accident was related to Russia’s
development of the Burevest-
nik, a nuclear-powered cruise
missile that would offer a nearly
unlimited range, allowing it to
f ly much longer than conven-
tionally powered cruise missiles.
Not long after the explo-
sion, President Donald Trump
revealed in a tweet that the
Un i t e d S t a t e s h a s “s i mi l a r,
though more advanced technol-
ogy” to the Burevestnik, some
times referred to as “Skyfall.”
The problem? The U.S. already
looked into nuclear-powered
cruise missiles more than 50
years ago—and rejected them as
completely impractical.
Back in the 1950s and ’60s,
the U.S. Air Force wanted a third
weapon in its arsenal in addition
to its intercontinental ballistic
missiles and strategic bombers
for delivering retaliatory strikes
against the Soviet Union in the
event of nuclear war. Enter the
Supersonic Low Altitude Missile,
or SLAM, which the Pentagon
The Most
Ill-Advised
Weapon in
U.S. History
Was Too
Dangerous
to Even Test
CO
UR
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LA
WR
EN
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LI
VE
RM
OR
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AT
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AL
LA
BO
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RY
// B Y K Y L E M I Z O K A M I //
7
Machines
20 March/April 2020