WWW.ASTRONOMY.COM 33integrity of the service module, and
whether its engines would be safe to use
in a rescue scenario. So they wished to
avoid employing them if at all possible.
Moreover, the spacecraft was
approaching the point where a “break-
even” in terms of energy would exist
between a direct return to Earth and a
circumlunar return — f lying around the
Moon and slingshotting back toward
Earth. Because of this, ground control-
lers decided to wait on the direct return
scenario to instead try the circumlunar
approach. This would also give them
more time to plan how the return would
safely get the astronauts back to Earth.
With the circumlunar option, more
time would be required, but it would be
much less risky and would use the
Moon’s gravity to propel the spacecraft
home. Because the crew were instructed
to chart a course that would get them to
the region of Fra Mauro, the craft had
departed from its initial trajectory prior
to the accident. So, in order to initiate a
free-return trajectory that would carry
them on the proper orbit, they needed to
conduct a short burn with the LM
descent engine. This burn lasted about
30 seconds.
Troubleshooting in space
Inside Aquarius, the supply of oxygen
was critically low, and would be only
marginally enough to see the crew back
to Earth. On the ground, Kranz plod-
ded along with his team, enlisting Ken
Mattingly to help controller John Aaron
devise a plan so that Odyssey could be
restarted, facilitating the landing on
Earth. Kranz simply declared, “Failure
is not an option.”
As Aquarius approached the Moon, the
astronauts were increasingly uncomfort-
able. They looked down upon the lunar
surface, coming as close as 158 miles
(254 km) at closest approach on April 15.
Lovell gazed onto the surface and
lamented the fact that he and Haise
would not walk on the Moon.
The astronauts then focused on the
business of returning to Earth. The tem-
perature inside Aquarius was near freez-
ing, making the conditions hard to bear.
Moreover, electrical power was running
dangerously low, and Haise was feeling
increasingly sick. He was experiencing a
urinary infection and running a fever,
very low in energy and generally feeling
terrible. It was a risky and calamitous situ-
ation. The lifeboat was becoming a diffi-
cult place in which to remain alive.The psychology of the crew also began
to crumble slightly. Swigert suspected
that the craft would not be able to return
to Earth, and that f light controllers were
withholding that fact from the crew.
Haise, feverish and ill, felt that Swigert’s
nominal experience may have played a
role in causing the accident. Before a full-
out argument could get rolling, however,
Lovell refocused his colleagues on the
mission of getting home. (When I inter-
viewed Lovell many years later, he did
tell me that the notion that the three of
them would become the first “human
popsicles in permanent orbit” was weigh-
ing heavily on all of their minds.)
Following their closest approach to
the Moon’s surface, the crew conducted
another burn of the LM descent engine.
This had the critical effect of speeding up
the return time to Earth by about 10
hours, and also shifting the landing spot
from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific
Ocean. Kranz and the other controllers
felt that, despite the deteriorating condi-
tions, the crew would have sufficient
oxygen, electricity, and water to return to
Earth on this timetable. This allowed
them to avoid a riskier maneuver that
would have involved jettisoning the ser-
vice module. After this key burn of theAnother view of the damaged service module taken prior to splashdown, clearly showing what had happened: An entire panel (top) had been blown off by the
oxygen tank explosion, and the interior damage was substantial. In this view, the S-band antenna is visible above the damaged area, and on the right side are
the service propulsion system engine and nozzle.