stronglydisagreewithLatour.His
workdescribingWalterLippmann
asbeing a moreperceptivethinker
than[John]Deweyairssomeof the
mostwrong-headedideasofdemo-
cracyandpoliticsthatI havereadin
a longtime. Butonissuesof climate
andnature,heis onthesideofthe
angelsandhasa lotofinteresting
thingsto say.
But,I havebeenmakinga more
underlyingpoint, tracingtheideolo-
gicalattitudesabout natureinthe
modern period tothe conceptual
foundationsof capitalism.I reallydo
thinkthatsustainedharmstothe
climateareendemictocapitalism
andit allgoesbackto thehistoryand
theintellectualhistoryoftheEarly
Modern period thatI justbriefly
outlined.
Areyoua relativistabouttruth
yourself,whetherscientific truthor
truthsaboutvaluesandculture?
No,I amnota relativist, butI don’t
thinkit isaneasythingtoargue
againstrelativism, andI certainly
don’tthinkyoucanargueagainstit
bysettingupsomeulteriornotionof
truthandsomemisleadinglyideal-
isednotionofscience, which has
littlerelevancetohowscienceis ac-
tuallypractisedin itsinstitutions
andthroughout itshistory. Kuhn
definitivelyshowedthat.
I don’tthinkI havethetimeto set
uptheconceptualapparatusto con-
veywhyexactlyI amnota relativist,
butI canjustsayverybriefly indeed
whattheverygeneraldirectionof
thinking is bywhichI rejectrelativ-
ism.Yousee, I don’treallythinkit
evenmakessenseto saytruthis relat-
iveto myperspectiveontheworld(or
relativeto myculture ormytheory).
It doesn’tmakesensebecauseit pre-
supposesthatonecanstepentirely
outsideofone’s perspective(orcul-
tureortheoryoftheworld)onto
someArchimedeanpositionandtalk
aboutone’sperspectiveasa whole
fromthatpositionoutsideit.And
claimthattruthis relativetoit. But
thereis no placewecanstandoutside
one’sperspectiveor cultureor theory
oftheworld.Thereis noviewfrom
nowhere.Andsotruthis justtruth
simpliciter, nottruthrelativeto this
orthat perspectiveor theory.Of
course,I (eachoneof us)judgethat
thisorthatpropositionis trueand
maketruthclaimsbythebestlightsI
havein myperspective, mytheoryof
theworld, myculturalstandpoint.
Whatother lightsdoI have? But
to saythatdoesnotmeanthattruth
is relativeto mylights,myperspect-
iveor theoryor culture.I wouldhave
to stepoutsidemyperspectiveto say
thelatterthing,andit is thatstep-
pingoutsidethatis impossible.It is a
bitofnonsensetothinkthatit is
possible. It literallymakesnosense
to saythatwecandothat. Sorelativ-
ismabouttruthis notreallyevena
meaningfullystateabledoctrine.
Tofullyexplain allthat,I’dneeda
lotmoreconceptualapparatus,but
thatis a verycrudeandsimplestate-
mentof thegeneraldriftor direction
of whyI thinkthereis norelativism.
Incidentally,if youwant toread
moreaboutthesubjectof relativism,
especiallyaboutvaluesandhowthey
affectcultureandpolitics, youmay
wanttolookata longanddetailed
reportthatPrabhatPatnaikandI
wrotefortheInternationalPanelon
SocialProgress,whereinthetheor-
eticalpartof thereport someof these
issuesof relativism,reason, identity,
etc.,insocialandpoliticalandcul-
turalmattersareaddressed.(You
canfindit inChapter 20 ofthere-
port.Thechapteris onthetopicof
“SocialBelonging”,andheandI were
jointlytheleadauthorsof thepanel
onthattopic.)WITHHOLDINGTRUTHSoyouaresayingthatpost-truth
issuesarenotreallyrelatedto or
continuouswithissuesabout
relativismregardingtruthnorwith
postmodernistphilosophy,
generally.
That’sright.I thinktheyarea quite
different setof issues.Foronething
post-truth is very specifically fo-
cussedonpolitics;it is mostoften
usedtodescribe certainelements
thathave entered veryrecentlyin the
political arena,mostubiquitouslyin
theU.S. butincreasinglyinother
countries too. And for another
(thoughnotunrelatedly),it is usedtodescribecertainalarmingandcyn-
icaltendenciesthathaveemerged in
socialmedia,as it is called, thataffect
politics,bothelectoralpoliticsas well
asthe ethos of politics generally
within which electoral politics
operates.
Tofullyunderstandwhatis dis-
tinctive,ifanythingisdistinctive,
aboutsuchpoliticalphenomena,you
havetorecordthecontinuitieswith
thepastaswell.It is notentirelyde
novo, byanymeans.
Onthesequestionsaboutpolitics
andpost-truth,firstof all,weshould
make a rudimentary distinction
betweenwithholding thetruthand
inventingthe“truth”.Thesearedif-
ferentphenomena.
Thefirstof thesehasbeenaround
fora verylongtimeinthepolitical
arena.Itisnotintheinterestsof
thoseinpowertohaveinformation
widelydisseminated.Democracy—
bywhichI meansubstantialdemo-
cracy,notjustproceduralorformal
democracy—depends on informa-
tionbeingwidelyavailabletothe
electorate (toordinary people,away
fromthecentresof powerandpriv-
ilege)sothattheycanexercisetheir
votein formal democracyfroma pos-
itionofcognitivestrength.(Bythe
way,thisispreciselywhatWalter
Lippmanndidnotwantinpolitics.
Hewas,inthissense,deeplyun-
democratic.)Elites,thosein orclose
to power and privilege, for that
reasondon’tlikedemocracytoget
toosubstantial.Thatis whyelites,
whetherpoliticaloracademic,keep
stressing “expertise” rather than
“knowledge”. Knowledge is some-
thingthatanybodyinanelectorate
can,inprinciple, acquireandpos-
sess.Everyone hasthecognitiveca-
pacitytodoso.Allthatis neededis
thetimeto acquireit anditsaccess-
ibility(whether in themediaor in the
variouslevelsoftheeducationsys-
tem). Expertise, by definition, is
somethingthatonlya fewpossess.It
wouldnotbeexpertiseif themassof
peoplepossessedit.
One strategy, then, by which
truth iswithheld inthe political
arenais forthosein powerto present
it asexpertise, something thatonly
thecognoscentinearpower possess,