126 International Relations Theory of War
The First World War (1914–1918)On June 28, 1914, Serbian heir presumptive Archduke Franz Ferdinand
and his wife, Sophie, were assassinated. In the month after their death,
Austro-Hungary and Serbia were at war and the rest of Europe’s countries
quickly joined them.^143 The First World War broke out.
In that war, the system effectively forced the outcomes and prevented
the rise of Germany to potential hegemon status. In the Germany unifica-
tion wars in the second half of the 19th century, Germany did not have
potential hegemon status in the system and the system did not force a
series of constraints to suppress its expansion. In the First World War, Ger-
many’s victory would have raised it to the status of potential hegemon
in the system—a result that the system resisted. Germany did not under-
stand its status, and its instigation of the war led the system to apply a
series of systemic pressures as soon as the war broke out in order to pre-
vent its victory in the war and its ensuing expansion. Two key constraints
that the system applied may be stated. Firstly, the German expectation that
Russia would not intervene to protect its protégé Serbia was found to be
wrong. Russia did intervene, thus transforming the small-scale war that
Germany predicted and aimed for into a European total war, which Ger-
many certainly did not want. Secondly, the German expectation that Great
Britain would not intervene on the side of Belgium and France was also
found to be wrong. Great Britain did intervene, and with the intervention
of the United States three years later, the British intervention had a major
influence resulting in Germany’s complete loss. Great Britain could not
reconcile with the collapse of the balance of power in Europe and the pos-
sibility of Germany rising to absolute hegemonic status in the continent.
London feared that if France and Russia would be defeated by Germany,
the European balance of power would collapse and Britain itself might
face a threat and danger.^144
The Second World War (1939–1945)Like the First World War, at the end of the Second World War, the system
also dictated the outcomes and prevented the rise of Germany to potential
hegemon status in the system. The answer to the question of why Hitler
lost after all his amazing early successes is the ultimate strategic error that
he made by invading Russia. That is what changed his fate from enor-
mous success to total destruction. Until Hitler’s invasion of Russia, Ger-
many was a great power in the system, but after the invasion, its status
took an extreme change and Nazi Germany became a potential hegemon
that posed a threat to the other players in the system. At that point, the
systemic constraints started to act, and the system not only prevented
Germany from winning the war but also dictated its loss and territorial
contraction.