How the Research Is Empirically Examined 131
territorially at their end: the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and the
U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003).
Constant territorial expansion of hyperpowers in unipolar systems at
the end of minor wars in which they participate stems from the manner
of influence that these systems have over the values of the two transhis-
torical order principles that constantly act in the international system—
anarchy and homeostasis. Any preservation or decrease in the land force
of the hyperpower at the end of wars in which it participates may lead
to a collapse of the system—a result that the homeostasis principle dictates
to the players to act to prevent. Therefore, in unipolar systems, the two
transhistorical order principles will force the sole hyperpowers constitut-
ing them to expand territorially. The two other territorial outcomes are
not possible at the end of minor wars that are fought in unipolar sys-
tems. Territorial contraction may infringe on the homeostasis, inasmuch
as a decrease in the land power of the hyperpower that loses territory
must lead to weakening in its total power. As a result, the equilibrium
will be impaired and the homeostasis will be in danger. A territorial sta-
tus quo may infringe on the homeostasis as the failure of the hyperpower
that does not expand territorially to gain land power effectively under-
mines the homeostasis principle, under which individual hyperpowers in
unipolar systems are supposed to behave according to their status as the
leading powers of the system—in other words, to uproot those that rise up
against them.
TERRITORIAL OUTCOMES AT THE END OF THE
POLAR POWERS’ WARS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN
In the period assessed in the study, 1816–2016, five wars were fought
involving one of the polar powers constituting the various systems
against Afghanistan—a small country in the system. These five wars were
fought in all three polarity models existing and assessed in the study:
the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838–1842), in the bipolar system of 1816–
1848; the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), in the bipolar system of
1871–1909; the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), in the multipolar system
of 1910–1945; the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1988), in the bipolar system
of 1946–1991; and the U.S.-Afghan War (2001), in the unipolar system of
1992–2016.
The five test cases are suitable for examining the theory because they
clearly correspond with the requirements that Alexander George pre-
sented for conducting the method of structured, focused comparison.^159
In each of these cases, the polar powers—Great Britain (in three wars),
the Soviet Union, and the United States—fought against the same country,
Afghanistan. In each of the periods in which these five wars were fought,