Int Rel Theo War

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136 International Relations Theory of War


involved very few losses. As early as the autumn of 1839, Dost Moham-
mad was replaced, Shah Shujah was crowned in Kabul, and the British
controlled the country by agreement and in practice, in addition to the
prestige that they had achieved in the surrounding area. However, the
foundations of British supremacy were unstable. The attempt to control
the entire country from the distant north in Kabul was learned to be an
error. In 1841, it was obvious to the British that the adventure had failed.
The preservation of Afghanistan as a buffer state was not worth the cost.
Nonetheless, unlike their military advisers, they could not expedite the
withdrawal out of concern regarding the overall influence that such an
action could have over British prestige. Because occupation was no lon-
ger a vital option either, the only thing left to do was wait.^173 Brittan’s
aspiration to strengthen its foothold in Afghanistan symbolized, alongside
additional things, the beginning of a more effective British policy toward
Russia. The realization of this option would not have helped it control Russia’s
policy in Europe and ensure that Britain would not depend on Russian
help there. That aspiration also countered Russia’s action toward Khiva in
central Asia, which started in 1839, for punishing the Uzbeks for having
taken slaves in raids on Russian caravans.^174


The British Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The situation remained quiet until 1841, when William MacNaughten,
the British representative in Kabul, was appointed as supervisor of events
and it was learned that the king had been acting as a puppet. The resis-
tance to the British occupation started in Kabul in late 1841 and quickly
expanded to the provinces.^175 It quickly expanded to form a national
uprising of tribal leaders against the British and Shah Shujah. A tempo-
rary agreement that was achieved allowed the British to withdraw from
Kabul, but the trust was breached and the garrison in Kabul massacred it
on its way to retreat in January 1842. The British reestablished their pres-
tige through a successful, albeit cruel massacre, and afterward completed
the withdrawal, leaving on the throne again Dost Mohammad, who in
turn surprisingly united Afghanistan.^176 In December 1842, 4,500 British
troops left Kabul en route to Jalalabad.^177


The First Anglo-Afghan War and Its Consequences

Both Sindh and Panjab suffered from the consequences of the British
defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War. Motifs of prestige and military strat-
egy led Britain to a series of wars, and these reached their peak in the occu-
pation of Sindh (1843) and Panjab (1849). Later, the British defeat in the
first Anglo-Afghan War led to a strategy that was intended to defend the
British Empire in India against extensive Russian expansion. That strategy

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