How the Research Is Empirically Examined 139
Britain conquered India from the sea and held onto it owing to the supe-
riority of its navy. Therefore, Afghanistan served in British military policy
as an obstacle between British and Russian interests in central Asia, more
than as a land passage. From the 1840s, Britain, and later Russia’s tsars,
was involved in military actions against the Afghans. These wars were
fought as broad wars. Both Britain and Russia failed, despite significant
local successes, to conquer and hold onto major parts of Afghan territory.
The British forces reconquered Kabul and Kandahar. The Afghan armies
were no match to the European armies in open battles, but the tribesmen
proved themselves as experts in guerilla warfare in the mountains and
inflicted severe losses on the European invaders. A war in the Afghan
mountains posed difficulties for movement and resupply, and the Euro-
pean armies had not yet found suitable answers for them. As a result, the
Afghans were able to maintain a great degree of political independence.^187
The InvasionThe complexity of war in Afghanistan was evident in the Third Anglo-
Afghan War (1919). In that war, both sides employed large forces: nearly
340,000 British troops fought against 200,000 Afghan regulars and gueril-
las. The British troops were equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry that
was developed in the First World War, such as strong explosives, armored
vehicles, wireless communications, and aircraft.^188
The Systemic Pressures for the British Pullout from AfghanistanThe Afghan attack on India was a delayed consequence of a plot that
the German delegation that visited Kabul in the First World War started,
as it was the Afghans who started the hostile actions. In February 1919, the
pro-British Amir Habibullah Khan was murdered. After a short uprising,
he was replaced by Amir Amanullah Khan, who owed his throne to anti-
British leaders of the Afghan army. Considering the British preoccupation
with the unrest in India and probably with Soviet support too, Amanullah
put his forces on alert on April 25. At the same time, an outpour of anti-
British propaganda flowed from Kabul toward the British forces on the
northwestern border of the province. The agents of Amanullah in Pesha-
war disseminated, using fast trucks, leaflets that declared that the Ger-
mans had resumed the war and India and Egypt were rising up against
Britain. Owing to the unique timing of the Afghan attack, which para-
doxically was carried out at the peak of Britain’s victories in Europe, the
British authorities were surprised. In contrast, the Anglo-Indian forces
were deployed more quickly than the Afghans expected and counterbal-
anced, with some degree of success, the initiative that was intended to
harm them.^189