176 Notes
- According to Waltz, the anarchic structure of the system is what has pre-
sented its change. In a hierarchic world, the appearance of a potential dominant
force, such as a leading election candidate, may motivate attempts to balance it.
However, if its success potential exceeds a certain point, it is likely that it will enjoy
bandwagoning of additional players that will ensure its victory. In an anarchic
world, in contrast, the appearance of a potential dominant force, such as a great
power that has the ability to become a hegemon in the system, may also experi-
ence enrolling players, but only upon it reaching the point at which its success will
appear possible. After this, the attempts to balance it will increase. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics, pp. 123–128. - Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Con-
struction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992),
pp. 391–425. - Samuel Huntington presented an argument to the contrary. He states that
the unipolar system will quickly reach its end because political leaders and intel-
lectual leaders in most countries strongly object to it and prefer the appearance of
a multipolar world in its place. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March 1999), pp. 35–49, at p. 42. - It is important to note that Jack Levy has ruled out this approach. He states
that because realism does not explain war well, it is difficult to say how war will
act as an agent of change within the realistic theory. Levy, “Theories of General
War,” p. 345. - Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and
the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International
Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000–2001), pp. 5–53; Randall L. Schweller and Wil-
liam C. Wohlforth, “Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of
the Cold War,” Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring 2000), pp. 60–107; Wohlforth,
“Realism and the End of the Cold War.” - Ofer Israeli, “The Unipolar Trap,” American Diplomacy (April 2013), pp. 1–8;
Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin Press,
2004). - Harrison R. Wagner, “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,”
World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 4 (July 1986), pp. 546–576, at pp. 546–547. - Randall L. Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 73–103, at p. 77. - Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 135.
- Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 202.
- Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” p. 7 fn. 6.
- Jack S. Levy, “Contending Theories of International Conflict: A Levels-of-
Analysis Approach,” in Chester A. Crocker and Fen O. Hampson, eds., Manag-
ing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 3–24, at p. 6. - The decision to include these four components stems from the fact that
combining them provides a wider spectrum of stability indices relative to tests that
were shown in other studies and were based on one index only. Two additional
main sources used the four components on which the current study is based for
checking the stability of the system: Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power