Notes 183
- Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globaliza-
tion (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999). - Fukuyama, “Challenges to World Order After September 11.”
- Schweller defines resources as potential military power. Schweller, “Tripo-
larity and the Second World War,” p. 77. - Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” p. 7.
- Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 131.
- Waltz argues that military power is a product of the six components that he
states, so one may conclude that most of his theory assumes that military power is
the only capability that is worthy of evaluation for determining the standing of a
state as a great power. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 98. Ted Hopf expands
Waltz’s definition slightly to polarity. In addition to measurement of military capa-
bilities by the players in the system, Hopf argues that the size of the population
and the revenues of the regime should also form a basis for determining the status
of a state as a pole in the system. Ted Hopf, “Polarity, the Offense-Defense
Balance, and War,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (June 1991),
pp. 475–493, at pp. 478–479. - In support of the argument of the current study, that economic power alone
is insufficient for bringing a country to polar power status in the system, two
prominent examples may be shown. The first example is Japan, whose enormous
economic power is insufficient for promoting it to this status. Yoichi Funabashi,
“Japan and the New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5 (Winter 1991–92),
pp. 58–74. The second example is the European Union, whose enormous economic
power is insufficient to promote it to this status. The person responsible for the
European Union’s foreign policy, for example, defined the period preceding the
Iraq War (2003) as the darkest period in his seven years in office, because it proved
the union’s limitations. Dan Bilefsky, “Solana, EU’s ‘Good Cop,’ Takes Stage,”
International Herald Tribune, August 11, 2006. - The sources of this approach may be found in the geopolitics approach that
was formed as a new discipline in the 1880s by a group of German theorists. That
discipline presented the principles of geographic and political science for studying
the global distribution of political power. By declaring that a state’s power and well-
being stem from its geopolitical size, these researches expected the great powers of
the future to be the countries that would acquire sufficient territory and raw materi-
als to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers:
The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 15. - Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660–1783 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1890). - Kennedy, “Mission Impossible.”
- The realist view of occupation argues that occupation pays well. According
to it, the more you conquer, the richer and stronger you get, so rulers have finan-
cial and security incentives to expand. In contrast, according to the liberal view,
occupation does not pay. This is because the more you conquer, the weaker you
become, because of entering a larger vortex of costs. Therefore, rulers do not have
financial incentive to expand. Peter Liberman, “The Spoils of Conquest,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 125–153, at p. 125. - Liberman, “The Spoils of Conquest.”
- Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographi-
cal Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4 (April 1904), pp. 421–437. Mackinder’s ideas had great