International Relations Theory of War 63
influence is top down (deductive). Thirdly, both these theories are defined
as systemic theories, but both base their systemic plea on a variable at the
state level and differ from each other primarily in this variable: one argues
that states tend to a status quo whereas the other argues that all states are
tend to revisionism. Table 2.4 summarizes the differences between these
three theories.
In addition to the theoretical flaws of the two main contemporary sys-
temic realist theories, they have several empiric flaws. I shall state the key
ones: neither theory is able to anticipate and explain the result or outcome
of the behavior of polar powers in various international systems. They
cannot explain the significant differences between the systemic interna-
tional outcome and the intrasystemic international outcome that the inter-
national relations theory of war explains.
There are additional points for criticism. Firstly, Waltz’s Theory of
International Politics (also known as the Balance of Power Theory) states
that any attempt by a polar power to disrupt the existing balance of
power and rise to hegemon status will result in balancing actions by
the other polar powers.^104 Therefore, it may be stated that the theory
did anticipate the way in which the other powers acting in the current
international system would act in response to the actions of the United
States since it rose to hyperpower status in the unipolar world,^105 inso-
far as the other powers have consistently attempted to restrain its steps.
However, the theory has failed to predict the results or outcomes of
their behavior, for the United States has not been influenced by these
attempts and has remained the sole polar power in the system. In
the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003), many countries in the system did act
according to the predictions of the theory and acted to counterbalance
the United States. However, the results or the outcomes of their action
were not completely in contrast to the forecast of the theory. Their activ-
ity was purposeless and did not affect the international outcomes as
defined in the current study: the United States’ instigation of the war
and its territorial expansion at its end.
Secondly, Mearsheimer’s Theory of Great Power Politics, which argues
that countries, primarily great powers, act to expand at all times, does
not provide an explanation for outcomes that are inconsistent with this
expectation, such as the two periods of peace in the 19th century and
early 20th century, 1816–1848, 1871–1910, and the Cold War period, 1946–
- The theory cannot explain why the United States did not act in a
revisionist manner from the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War until the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11 either.^106
Table 2.5 concentrates the key directions of the international relations
theory of war that have been presented up to this point.