38 Chapter One
Under the new leadership of M. S. Vorontsov, named Russian viceroy of the
Caucasus in 1844, Russia tried a different approach. It began to actively sponsor
the hajj from the Caucasus as a way of bringing it under state control. Two
decrees issued by the tsar, in 1844 and 1845, authorized free passports for Mus-
lims traveling to Mecca (they were required only to pay a fifty-kopeck fee for the
paper document). At the same time, with an eye toward “strengthening” the net-
work of Russian consulates and agents abroad providing “protection” to Muslims
traveling to holy places, Russian officials in the Caucasus began to interview
local Muslim clergy about pilgrims’ routes to Mecca. These interviews revealed
that some Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiʿis, continued to favor the Syrian route
through Damascus over an alternate sea route by way of Trabzon, Istanbul, and
Cairo.^62 In the spirit of intelligence gathering, the Damascus vice-consulate gave
Russian officials in the Caucasus an institution to consult about the hajj traffic
abroad, along the main route that connected the region to Mecca.
By sponsoring the hajj between the Caucasus and Syria, Russian officials
were not trying to encourage it. On the contrary, Vorontsov instructed local
officials in the Caucasus to “limit” the number of passports to Mecca, issuing
them only to those whose local district chief could vouch for their trustworthi-
ness and the absence of “harmful intentions” toward the Russian government.^63
Instead, the main goal was to get more Muslims to apply for Russian passports
to Mecca, and in this way provide Russian officials in the Caucasus with more
information about who made the hajj, and by which routes. Russian officials
envisioned passports serving at least two important functions. First, they were
a mechanism for identifying powerful elites to recruit into the Russian admin-
istration. In a report urging the tsar to decree free passports to Mecca, Nessel-
rode argued that this measure would allow Russian officials in the Caucasus to
identify and “lure” to the government “influential people from among those
returning from Mecca.”^64 Russian officials also used passports for surveillance.
In them they recorded details of the routes pilgrims planned to take, and then
contacted Russian consulates posted along these routes abroad to ask them to
keep track of pilgrims and report back to officials in the Caucasus on their
activities.^65
This pragmatic plan meshed with Vorontsov’s broader efforts to cooperate
with local Muslim elites in the Caucasus, and co-opt them into the Russian
army and administration. At the same time, it reflected his growing concern
about the hajj as a security threat. In 1846 Vorontsov had received credible
information that Imam Shamil, the leader of the Muslim rebellion in the North
Caucasus, was communicating with and receiving support from Muslim clergy