Notes 231
(^4) The dotted line between Shared and Common/Background shows that Shared,
while less than 100% certainty, represents a stronger belief/knowledge than
Common/Background.
(^5) A further objection, that of solipsism, will be discussed on p. 58.
(^6) t indicates term, i.e. lexical items utilized by the speaker and R the referent the
object the speaker intends to refer to. For example, in the example printed in
endnote 7 t is Ann’s use of the defi nite referring expression the movie showing at
the Roxy tonight and R is Monkey Business.
(^7) Clark and Marshall (1981: 13) suggest the following scenario. ‘On Wednesday
morning Ann and Bob read the early edition of the newspaper and discuss that it
says that A Day at the Races is playing that night at the Roxy. Later Ann sees the late
edition, notes that the movie has been corrected to Monkey Business, and marks it
with her blue pencil. Still later, as Ann watches without Bob knowing it, he picks
up the late edition and sees Ann’s pencil mark. That afternoon Ann sees Bob and
asks, “Have you ever seen the movie showing at the Roxy tonight?” Ann knows
that the fi lm is Monkey Business. She (speaker) knows that Bob knows that the
movie is Monkey Business. Furthermore she (speaker) knows that Bob (hearer)
knows that she (speaker) knows that the fi lm is Monkey Business. Yet Ann is not
justifi ed in thinking that Bob will know she is referring to Monkey Business. After
all he might well reason that that while he knows Ann knows that the fi lm is
Monkey Business but as he doesn’t know she knows that he knows that the fi lm is
Monkey Business, she is referring to A Day at the Races.’
(^8) Except of course as an instantiation of neural activity.
(^9) Successfully returning a tennis ball like successful communication is not a
hundred per cent guaranteed. However, the more skilful and experienced the
performer the greater the possibility of success.
(^10) Austin subdivides the category of locutionary acts into three: the phonetic act –
the uttering of certain noises; the phatic act – the uttering of certain words
conforming to a certain grammar; and the rhetic act – the performance of the act
with a certain sense and reference (1975: 95).
(^11) Grice’s article was originally published in Philosophical Review 66 (1957).
(^12) Austin (1975: 151), himself, proposed a loose classifi cation of speech acts into
fi ve very general classes: Verdictives – the act of issuing a verdict; Exercitives – the
act of exercising power or infl uence; Commissives – the act of committing to
doing something; Behabitives – the act of showing one’s attitudes and social
behaviour; and Expositives – the act of fi tting a response into a discourse, i.e. as
marking one’s contribution as a reply or an argument, etc.
(^13) Searle’s inclusion of a propositional content rule shows that, unlike Austin, his
category of illocutions contains and subsumes locutions.
(^14) He claims, to my mind unconvincingly, that pragmatics needs to concern itself
solely with theorizing about publicly available instances of language behaviour
(ibid. 34).
(^15) Gunter follows the transcription system devised by Trager and Smith (1951). This
system has four pitch levels; 4 is the highest and 1 the lowest. A 3... 1↓ is a
neutral fall. A 1... 1↑ is a low rise.
(^16) To ensure the presence of one example from each of Searle’s categories –
excluding declarations – I have changed Couper-Kuhlen’s example ‘I welcome
you to our city’ to ‘I invite you to our city’.