Dikaiosunê (δικαιοσύνη): justice, righteousness. Diogenes Laertius noted that for the Stoics, it
meant “being in harmony with the law and tending to bring people together” (Lives of the Eminent
Philosophers 7.99; not here). It is one of the four cardinal virtues (i.e., self-control, justice, courage,
and wisdom). The word is used seventeen times in Marcus, always in the spirit Diogenes Laertius
outlines, where it appears with the other virtues (see especially 3.6, 5.12, 7.63, and 12.15). Epictetus
is notable in 3.1.6b–9, where he speaks of “the just” as the kind of person we should strive to be.
Dogma (δόγμα): that which seems to one; opinion or belief; philosophically, dogmata are
principles or judgments established by reason and experience. Haines notes that “what the
sensations are to the body and impulses to the soul, dogmata are to the intelligence.” Epictetus takes
aim at the untested form of dogmata by framing them as τὰ πονηρὰ δόγματα, or oppressive or
worthless opinions that must be rooted out by our reasoned choice (Discourses 3.3.18–19; see also
3.19.2–3) before they destroy our inner fortress (4.1.86). The term appears more than one hundred
times in Epictetus (see Enchiridion 5 , where he says that it’s not things that disturb us, but our
judgments/dogmata about them) and twenty-three times in Marcus (see especially 4.49, 7.2, 8.1,
8.22, and 8.47, where he often talks about straightening out your principles). Marcus and Epictetus
also use the word krima (κρῖμα) when talking about decisions and judgment (Marcus, Meditations
11.11, 8.47; Epictetus, Discourses 4.11.7).
Dokimazein (δοκιμάζω): to assay; to put to the test; to thoroughly examine. This is a key verb in
understanding Epictetus’s Stoicism (found ten times in the Discourses and once in the opening of the
Enchiridion), but it was not used by Marcus. The word carries the meaning of the assayist, one who
tests fine metals and coins to verify their authenticity. In one of the most memorable passages in
Epictetus, he compares our need to test impressions to what is done with coins and how the skilled
merchant can hear a counterfeit coin cast upon a table just as a musician would detect a sour note
(Discourses 1.2.7–11ff). See also the exercises he gives for handling impressions (Discourses
2.18.24; Enchiridion 1.5). As sense impressions need to be put to the test, so too our judgments
(dogmata/theôrêma) need a tough cross-examination (ἐλέγχω; used by both Epictetus and Marcus) to
be fully tested.
Doxa (δόξα): belief, opinion.
Ekklisis (ἔκκλισις): aversion; inclination away from a thing. The opposite of, but often appearing
with, orexis. This is the first level of self-coherence (see chart). Epictetus warns repeatedly that with
aversions we must be careful to apply them only to our own concerns and not to those controlled by
others (see Discourses 4.1.81–82ff; not here). The word appears fifty-three times in the Discourses.
In a vivid metaphor of a sparring match, Marcus tells us we can avoid people who might have ill
intent without being suspicious toward them (6.20). In step with Epictetus, Marcus urges us to limit
our aversion to only those things in our power (8.7). See orexis.
Ekpyrôsis (ἐκπύρωσις): cyclical conflagration (birth and rebirth) of the universe. This idea,
central to Stoic physics and cosmology, goes back to Heraclitus (Marcus 3.3; not here). Stoics equate
this fire with the all-permeating reason (logos spermatikos) of the universe (see Marcus 6.24).
Eleutheria (ἐλευθερία): freedom, liberty. The masses say that only the free can be educated, but the
Stoic says that only the educated can be free (Discourses 2.1.21–22). Including the adjectival form, it
appears more than one hundred times in the Discourses. Marcus uses the noun five times (see 5.9).
Eph’ hêmin (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν): what is up to us; what is in our control; our correct use of impressions,
impulses, and judgments. The Enchiridion (or Handbook) of Epictetus opens with this most famous
of all Stoic phrases. Epictetus says when we want something outside our control, we are stricken with