control (8.7). The verb form, ὀρέγω/oregô, meaning to reach out for, yearn for, often appears and in
many instances it occurs with “not missing the mark”; see hamartanô and apotynchanô.
Ousia (οὐσία): substance or being, sometimes used interchangeably with hulê (matter,
material). Marcus speaks vividly of substance being “like a river’s unending flow, its activities
constantly changing and causes infinitely shifting so that almost nothing at all stands still” (5.23),
harkening back to Heraclitus (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 9.8).
Paideia (παιδεία): training, teaching, and education. Askeô, manthanô, and meletaô (see chart) are
each a part of getting an education as outlined by Epictetus in Discourses 2.9.13–14. The daily
disciplines are central to being educated for the Stoic, and only the educated are truly free (2.1.21–23
and 1.22.9–10a). Working over our preconceptions (prolêpsin) is the point of education (1.2.5–7).
Pathos (πάθος): passion or emotion, often excessive and based on false judgments. Haines places
passion as the “affect” following from hormê that lead to acts against nature. The four passions
divide into two types: ( 1 ) for things not in present possession or anticipated in the future, which are
desire (ἐπιθυμία) and fear (φόβος); and (2) for things presently engaging a person, which are
pleasure (ἡδονή) and distress (λύπη). Epictetus states the Stoic position most clearly in Discourses
4.1.175: “Freedom isn’t secured by filling up on your heart’s desire but by removing your desire.”
Diogenes Laertius says that Zeno defined passion/emotion as an irrational and unnatural movement
in the soul, or as excessive hormê (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 7.110). Despite the popular
misconception, the Stoics did celebrate certain passions as good (eupatheia), if in rational bounds: in
particular, joy, caution, and wishing (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 7.116).
Phantasia (φαντασία): impression, appearance, perception. Epictetus says (1.1.7–9) that the gods
gave us one power that governs all the rest—“the ability to make the right use of appearances.” He
also says that the first and greatest task of the philosopher is to test (δοκιμάζω, “to assay”) and
separate appearances (see also 2.18.24). He uses the metaphors of sweeping currents, battle, and the
rigorous training of an athlete for the work we must do to hold our own against impressions
(2.18.27–28). “The task of the good and excellent person is to handle their impressions in harmony
with nature” (3.3.1). There are more than two hundred references to phantasia in the Discourses and
nine in the Enchiridion ( 34 ). The term appears about forty times in Marcus’s Meditations (5.2, 5.16,
6.13, 8.7, 8.26, 8.28–29). Marcus has a great exercise for not telling yourself more than initial
impressions (“report” in 8.49).
Phronêsis (φρόνησις): practical wisdom, one of the four cardinal virtues. The term is used
repeatedly by Marcus, most memorably in 4.37, where he says that “wisdom and acting justly are one
and the same,” and in 5.9, where he says “there is nothing so pleasing as wisdom itself.” See arête.
Physis (φύσις): nature, the natural order; of things, species, or kind: characteristic. Both
Epictetus and Marcus repeatedly state that we must use our ruling principle to keep ourselves in
harmony with nature (Discourses 4.4.43; Marcus 3.9). In Stoic thought, God and nature are one.
Pneuma (πνεῦμα): air, breath, spirit; a principle in Stoic physics. The part of the soul set into
disturbance by desires and aversions, which Haines calls the inferior part of the soul, distinct from
nous (mind). Epictetus has a memorable image in Discourses 3.3.20–22, where he talks about the
movement of a disturbed bowl of water being like the spirit in which things exist.
Proêgmena (προηγμένα): preferred things; indifferent in an absolute moral sense, but of
relative positive value, naturally desirable things, such as health. Opposite of aproêgmena.