The 48 Laws Of Power

ofoneofthe
greatest

civilizationsofalltime.TheAthenianswereledinto

thisdisaster

by

their

hearts,

nottheirminds.

They

saw

only

thechanceof

glory,

notthe

dangers

thatloomedinthedistance.

Cardinalde

Retz,

the

seventeenth-century

Frenchmanwho

prided

himselfonhis

insights

intohumanschemesand

why

theymostly

fail,

ana-

lyzed

this

phenomenon.

Inthecourse ofarebellion he

spearheaded

against

theFrench

monarchy

in

1651,

the

youngking,

Louis

XIV,

andhis

court

had

suddenly

leftParisandestablishedthemselvesina

palace

out-

sidethe

capital.

The

presence

ofthe

king

soclosetotheheartoftherevo-

lutionhadbeenatremendousburdenonthe

revolutionaries,

and

they

breatheda

sigh

ofrelief.Thislater

proved

their

downfall,

however,

since

thecourt’sabsencefromParis

gave

itmuchmoreroomtomaneuver.

“The

most

ordinary

causeof

people’s

mistakes,”

CardinaldeRetzlater

wrote,

“istheir

being

toomuch

frightened

at

the

presentdanger,

andnot

enough

soatthatwhichisremote.”

The

dangers

thatare

remote,

thatloominthedistance-—ifwecansee

themas

they

take

shape,

how

many

mistakesweavoid.How

manyplans

wewould

instantly

abortifwerealizedwewere

avoiding

asmall

danger

only

to

step

into

a

larger

one.Somuchof

power

is

notwhat

you

do

but

what

you

donotdo——therashandfoolishactionsthat

you

refrainfrombe-

fore

theygetyou

intotrouble.Planindetailbefore

you

act—donotlet

vagueplans

lead

you

into trouble.Will thishave unintendedconse-

quences?

WillI

stir

up

new

enemies?

Will

someone

elsetake

advantage

of

my

labors?

Unhappy

endings

are muchmore common than

happy

ones——donotbe

swayedby

the

happyending

in

your

mind.

TheFrenchelectionsof 1848 camedowntoa

struggle

betweenLouis-

Adolphe

Thiers,

themanof

order,

andGeneralLouis

Eugene

Cavaignac,

therabble-rouserofthe

right

WhenThiersrealizedhewas

hopelessly

be-

hindinthis

high—stakes

race,

hesearched

desperately

fora

solution.

His

eye

fellonLouis

Bonaparte,grand-nephew

ofthe

greatgeneral

Napoleon,

anda

lowly

deputy

inthe

parliament.

This

Bonaparte

seemedabitofan

imbecile,

buthisnamealonecould

get

himelectedina

countryyearning

fora

strong

ruler.HewouldbeThiers’s

puppet

and

eventually

wouldbe

pushedoffstage.

Thefirst

part

of

the

plan

worked to

perfection,

and

Napoleon

waselected

by

a

largemargin.

The

problem

wasthatThiers

hadnotforeseenone

simple

fact:This“imbecile”wasinfactamanof

enormousambition.Three

years

laterhedissolved

parliament,

declared

himself

emperor,

andruledFranceforanother

eighteenyears,

muchto

thehorrorofThiersand

his

party.

The

ending

is

everything.

Itistheendof

the

action

that

determines

who

gets

the

glory,

the

money,

the

prize.

Yourconclusionmustbe

crystal

clear,

and

you

must

keep

it

constantly

inmind.Youmustalso

figure

out

howtowardoffthevultures

circling

overhead,

trying

toliveoffthecar-

cassof

your

creation.And

you

must

anticipate

the

manypossible

crises

thatwill

tempt

you

to

improvise.

Bismarckovercamethese

dangers

be-

causehe

planned

tothe

end,

kept

oncourse

throughevery

crisis,

and