Till‘,l'Ri?l"l'KM)
HIE(Ll§§€.'l~i(),\
A
ftlvlwrmmz
inthe
month
of
May
.r(tmcl
angltng
onthebank
of
(IntTltameswithrm
arr!/lcitzlfly.
Hethrew
hisbailwith
soInuch
an,that4:
young
rmm
wax
rurftmg
ruwrzm’
it,
whenshewas
prevetztzrlby
hm‘
tmvrhrr.“Navcr."mid
rile,
“my
chtld,
betoo
precipitate,
when:there
ixll
po.r.\'t'bili(_vof
danger.
TakedueItme
to
consider,lteforeyou
riskanaction
aim:
ntny
tie/"am!
Howknow
you
whether
yon
tlppmtlailcz’
hrimlr.-eda
fly.
orIhtesnare
ofan
unetny?
Letsomeone
elsemakethe
expert?
mm:
beforeyou.Ifit
be
u/i’)=,
hewill
very
p!‘()b(£[71}'
eludethe
fin:
tzlmck:and
the
Secottd
may
be
made,iftmt
with
sitccesx.
atleast
with
.st1fe1y."
Shithadnostmmtr
spo-
lmn,1hmz
a
gttdgeon
suizeclthe
pretended
fly.
andbecmnemt
exanxplc
tothe
giddy
tlaughrer
oflheimpor-
tance
of
her
mother":
counsel.
r/xnuas.
ROBERTDonsmv.
1'/tl3—l 764
Nextthereis
fimed
time:theshort—termtimethatwecan
manipulate
asan
offensive
weapon,upsetting
the
timing
ofour
opponents.Finally
thereis
end
lime,
whena
plan
mustbeexecutedwith
speed
andforce.Wehave
waited,
foundthe
moment,
andmustnothesitate.
Long
Time.Thefamous
seventeenth-centuryMingpainter
Chou
Yung
relatesa
story
thatalteredhisbehaviorforever.Lateonewinterafternoon
hesetout tovisitatownthat
lay
acrosstheriverfromhisowntown.He
was
bringing
some
important
books
and
papers
withhimandhadcommis-
sioneda
youngboy
to
help
him
carry
them.As
the
ferry
neared
theother
sideofthe
river,
Chou
Yung
askedtheboatmanif
they
wouldhavetimeto
get
tothetownbeforeits
gates
closed,
sinceitwasamile
away
and
night
was
approaching.
Theboatman
glanced
atthe
boy,
andatthebundleof
loosely
tied
papers
and
books-“Yes,”
he
replied,
“if
you
donotwalktoo
fast.”
As
they
started
out, however,
thesunwas
setting.
Afraidof
being
lockedoutofthetownat
night,prey
tolocal
bandits,
Chouandthe
boy
walkedfasterand
faster,
finallybreaking
intoarun.
Suddenly
the
string
aroundthe
papers
broke
andthe
documents
scatteredonthe
ground.
It
tookthem
many
minutes
to
put
the
packettogetheragain,
and
by
thetime
they
hadreachedthe
citygates,
itwastoolate.
When
you
forcethe
pace
outoffearand
impatience,
you
createanest
of
problems
that
requirefixing,
and
you
end
uptaking
much
longer
thanif
you
had
taken
your
time.Hurriers
mayoccasionallyget
there
quicker,
but
papers
flyeverywhere,
new
dangers
arise,
and
they
find
themselvesincon-
stantcrisis
mode,
fixing
the
problems
that
they
themselveshavecreated.
Sometimes
not
acting
inthefaceof
danger
is
your
best
move»-you
wait,
youdeliberately
slowdown.Astime
passes
itwill
eventuallypresentop
portunitiesyou
hadnot
imagined.
Waiting
involves
controlling
not
onlyyour
ownemotionsbut
thoseof
your
colleagues,
who,
mistaking
acfionfor
power,
maytry
to
push
you
into
making
rashmoves.In
your
rivals,
ontheother
hand,
you
can
encourage
thissamemistake:If
you
let
themrush
headlong
into
trouble
while
you
standback
and
wait,
you
willsoon
find
ripe
moments
to
intervene
and
pick
up
the
pieces.
Thiswise
policy
wasthe
principal
strategy
ofthe
greatearly-
seventeenthcenturyemperor
Tokugawa
Ieyasu
of
japan.
Whenhis
prede~
cessor,
the
headstrongHideyoshi,
whomheservedas3.
general,staged
a
rash
invasionof
Korea,
leyasu
didnotinvolvehimself.Heknewtheinva-
sionwouldbeadisasterandwouldleadto
Hideyoshfs
downfall,Betterto
stand
patiently
onthe
sidelines,
even
finmanyyears,
andthenbein
position
toseize
power
whenthetimeis
rightmexactly
what
Ieyasudid,
with
great
anistry.
Youdonot
deliberately
slowtime
down
tolive
longer,
ortotakemore
pleasure
inthe
moment,
but
thebetterto
play
the
game
of
power.
First,
when
your
mindisuncluttered
by
constant
emergenciesyou
willseefur»
therintothefuture.
Second,
you
willbeabletoresistthebaitsthat