Introduction to Corporate Finance

(Tina Meador) #1
ONLINE CHAPTERS

explanations of mergers are more ominous. We already mentioned the empire-building tendencies that
are sometimes linked to upper management.
Roll (1986) offers a somewhat different rationale with his overconfidence or hubris hypothesis of
corporate takeovers. Roll contends that some managers overestimate their own managerial capabilities and
pursue takeovers in the belief that they can better manage their target than can its current management
team. Acquiring managers then overbid for the target and fail to realise the expected post-merger gains,
thereby diminishing shareholder wealth. Thus, the intent of the managers is not contrary to the best
interests of shareholders (the managers think they will create value), but the result is still value decreasing.

example

Let’s say Peanut Butter Pty Ltd decides to buy Jam Sandwiches Co. for $100 million. The deal should generate
cost savings because both companies have similar retail markets and can tap the marketing and distribution
channels of the other. Also, people tend to pay more for peanut butter and jam sandwiches than they would
for each product individually.
Peanut Butter has 10 million shares outstanding and an annual net income of $50 million, so EPS is
$5. Peanut Butter’s current share price is $100. Jam has 5 million shares outstanding and annual net income
of $15 million.
After-tax synergies: The merger results in savings of around $5 million annually. Additionally, because of
increased demand due to the popularity and convenience of premade peanut butter and jam sandwiches,
Peanut Butter’s bankers estimate additional synergies of $2.14 million. Total pre-tax synergies are therefore
$7.14 million. At a tax rate of 30%, after-tax synergies are $5 million.
Financing the acquisition: Of the $100 million purchase price, assume Peanut Butter pays Jam’s
shareholders with $50 million in cash, and $50 million in Peanut Butter shares. This involves:
1 Issuing $30 million in new debt. At 10% yield to maturity, this will result in annual interest payments of $3.0
million each year. For simplicity, we are assuming that the new debt is perpetual (it never retires).
2 Withdrawing $20 million in corporate cash, which was originally earning 5% per year.
3 Issuing 600,000 new shares at $100 each. Use $50 million of the proceeds to pay Jam’s shareholders, and
the remainder to retire $10 million of Jam’s debt, which incurred annual interest at a rate of 6.7% per year.
This results in annual interest expense savings of $1.5 million, or $1.05 million in after-tax savings (because
interest expense is tax deductible, creating a tax shield of $450,000 = $1.5 m × 30%).

Adjustments:
1 After-tax depreciation and amortisation from write-ups: As a result of the merger, Peanut Butter will be
taking over four of Jam’s plants. Equipment in the plant was purchased for around $30.0 million, but is
valued at $45.4 million in the takeover. The difference of $15.4 million is known as a write-up. Assuming
that Peanut Butter is able to depreciate this over 10 years, it can deduct depreciation of $1.54 million
per year. Applying a 30% tax rate, this translates to after-tax depreciation from write-ups of around $1.08
million a year.
2 After-tax interest expense because of new financing: New financing results in annual interest expense of
$3.0 million per year. After-tax annual interest expense is therefore $2.10 million a year (30% tax rate).
3 Opportunity cost of cash balances: The $20 million used to pay for the acquisition could have been earning
5%, or $1 million a year pre-tax, $700,000 per year after-tax.
4 Add interest expense associated with target’s debt that is retired: Saving $1.05 million in after-tax interest
expense will increase earnings going forward.

Total adjustments = – $1.08 million – $2.10 million – $700,000 + $1.05 million = –$2.83 million

thinking cap
question

Does the interest that a


company has to pay if it uses


debt to finance an acquisition


affect EPS? If so, does the


effect dilute earnings or is it


accretive?


hubris hypothesis of
corporate takeovers
A theory that contends that
some managers overestimate
their own managerial
capabilities and pursue
takeovers with the belief
that they can better manage
their takeover target than the
target’s current management




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