Polıteía 53
two kings for aid and comfort in their struggles against each other, the same
is likely to have been true for the Spartiates. The two thrones were natural foci
of power and influence. The character of the political and social organization
of Lacedaemon strongly encouraged the political class to group itself into two
factions around the two thrones.^54
A division along these lines did not always come to pass. As we will soon
learn, Theopompus and Polydorus were allies, not rivals, in the early seventh
century and succeeded in carrying out a thorough reform against bitter aris-
tocratic opposition. And where there was no such division, it did not by any
means guarantee consensus. As I point out elsewhere, Cleomenes’ success in
eliminating the hostile occupant of the rival throne and in replacing him with
a dependent of his own did not end all opposition to his schemes in the late
sixth and early fifth centuries.^55 Moreover, Sthenelaidas the ephor managed
to push Sparta into war in 432 despite the firm opposition of the Eurypontid
monarch Archidamus and almost certainly without the support of the rival
house.^56 S p a r t a’s basıleîs were important, not all-important. In general, they
were at the center of conflict—and where the two kings are not known to have
been friends and allies or proponents of the same policy, it is reasonable to
suspect that they were at odds.
The Elders
The gerousía was the least dangerous branch of the Spartan government,
but not the least important. In fact, Plutarch came very close to the mark when
he described the Spartan regime as a mixture “of democracy and kingship,
with an aristocracy to preside over it and adjudicate in the greatest affairs.” In
normal circumstances, when the ephors were nonentities and the two kings
were rivals of no particular talent, the gérontes were in a position to exercise
great influence, though not to initiate policy. One measure of their authority is
the fact that Demosthenes speaks of this body of men as “the master [despótēs]
of the many.” Dionysius of Halicarnassus advances a similar claim, contending
that, while Sparta retained her independence, “the kings of the Lacedaemoni-
ans were not autocrats able to do whatever they wished, for the gerousía pos-
sessed full power over public affairs.”^57
Even if we were to discount these assertions and to suppose them hyper-
bolic, as we probably should, we would still have to acknowledge that the
gerousía was a formidable instrument of government. Even if it had been ef-