nonvotingstockholdersandlargerforcountrieswithoutsuch
protection.
55
Someofthesestudiesmentionedalsohypothesize(andtest)
forwhyvotingpremiumsmayvarywithinthesamemarket.
Zingales, in a 1994 studyof Italianstocks, concludes that
someofthevotingpremiumdifferencesacrossItalianshares
canbeexplainedbytheproportionofsharesthatarevoting
shares(lowerproportionstranslateintolargerpremiumsper
share) andthedividendprivileges ofnonvotingshares(the
greater the privileges, the smaller the premium).
56 However,healsoconcludesthatalargeproportionofthe
differencesinvotingsharepremiumscannotbeexplainedby
these variables, and given the low likelihood of hostile
takeovers,heattributesthedifferencestoprivatebenefitsthat
accrue to voting shareholders.
Inanattempttoisolatetheeffectofcontrolonvotingshare
premiums,Linciano(2002)examinedtheeffectsofchanges
intakeover lawandcorporate governanceonItalianvoting
and nonvoting shares.
57 A “mandatory bid” rule, introduced in 1992 in Italy,
allowedsmallvotingshareholderstoreceivethesamepricein
anacquisitionaslargevotingshareholdersbutdidnotextend
tononvotingshareholders.Notsurprisingly,thepremiumon
votingsharesincreasedmarginally(about 2 percent)afterthis
rule.Asubsequentcorporategovernancereformlawin1997,
which increased the power of nonvoting shareholders,
decreased thepremium byabout 7 percent. Nenova (2001)
reports similar results from Brazil, where decreased
protectionforminoritystockholdersina 1997 lawdoubled