of hostile takeovers and management change than other
companies.
24 K. G. Palepu, “Predicting Take-Over Targets: A
Methodological and Empirical Analysis,” Journal of
Accounting and Economics8 (1986): 3–35.
25 D. S. North, “The Role of Managerial Incentives in
Corporate Acquisitions: The 1990s Evidence,” Journal of
Corporate Finance7 (2001): 125–149.
26 R.Nuttall,“Take-OverLikelihoodModelsforUKQuoted
Companies,” Nuffield College working paper, Oxford
University, 1999; C. Weir, “Corporate Governance,
PerformanceandTake-Overs:AnEmpiricalAnalysisofUK
Mergers,”Applied Economics29 (1997): 1465–1475.
27 L. Pinkowitz, “The Market for Corporate Control and
CorporateCashHoldings,”workingpaper,SSRN,2003.His
study of hostile acquisitions between 1985 and 1994
concludesthat firmswith largecash balances areless(not
more) likely to be targets of hostile acquisitions.
28 Inacontraryfinding,FranksandMayer(1996)find no
evidence of poor performance in target firms in hostile
acquisitionsintheUnitedKingdom.J.FranksandC.Mayer,
“Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of Management
Failure,”Journal of Financial Economics40 (1996): 163–181.
29 J.Warner,R.Watts,andK.Wruck,“StockPricesandTop
ManagementChanges,”Journal ofFinancialEconomics 20
(1988):461–492;K.MurphyandJ.Zimmerman,“Financial
Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover,” Journal of