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42 Evenifitisnotthepopularview,itisthepopulistview
thathasfoundcredenceinHollywood,inmovieslikeWall
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43 J.M.KarpoffandP.H.Malatesta,“TheWealthEffectsof
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FinancialEconomics 25 (1990): 291–322. Thecontroversy
provoked by the Pennsylvania antitakeover law created a
strongcountermovementamonginstitutionalinvestors, who
threatenedtoselltheirholdings inPennsylvaniacompanies
that opted to be covered by the law. Faced with this
ultimatum,manyPennsylvaniafirmschosetooptoutofthe
antitakeover law.
44 S.H.SzewczykandG.T.Tsetsekos,“StateInterventionin
the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of the
Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310,” Journal of Financial
Economics31 (1992): 3–24.
45 C. Weir,D.Laing,and P.J.McKnight, “AnEmpirical
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onthe Performanceof UK Firms,”working paper,Cardiff
Business School, 2002.
46 R. Khurana and N. Nohria, “The Performance
Consequences of CEO Turnover,” working paper, SSRN
2002.