The Digital DictatorsMarch/April 2020 113
Instead, aspiring dictatorships can purchase new technologies, train
a small group o o¾cials in how to use them—often with the support
o external actors, such as China—and they are ready to go. For ex-
ample, Huawei, a Chinese state-backed telecommunications ¥rm, has
deployed its digital surveillance technology in over a dozen authori-
tarian regimes. In 2019, reports surfaced that the Ugandan govern-
ment was using it to hack the social media accounts and electronic
communications o its political opponents. The vendors o such tech-
nologies don’t always reside in authoritarian countries. Israeli and
Italian ¥rms have also sold digital surveillance software to the Ugan-
dan regime. Israeli companies have sold espionage and intelligence-
gathering software to a number o authoritarian regimes across the
world, including Angola, Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, and Ni-
caragua. And U.S. ¥rms have exported facial recognition technology
to governments in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
A SLIPPERY SLOPE
As autocracies last longer, the number o such regimes in place at
any point in time is likely to increase, as some countries backslide
on democratic rule. Although the number o autocracies globally has
not risen substantially in recent years, and more people than ever
before live in countries that hold free and fair elections, the tide
may be turning. Data collected by Freedom House show, for exam-
ple, that between 2013 and 2018, although there were three coun-
tries that transitioned from “partly free” to “free” status (the
Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, and Tunisia), there were seven that
experienced the reverse, moving from a status o “free” to one o
“partly free” (the Dominican Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Leso-
tho, Montenegro, Serbia, and Sierra Leone).
The risk that technology will usher in a wave o authoritarianism is
all the more concerning because our own empirical research has indi-
cated that beyond buttressing autocracies, digital tools are associated
with an increased risk o democratic backsliding in fragile democracies.
New technologies are particularly dangerous for weak democracies be-
cause many o these digital tools are dual use: technology can enhance
government e¾ciency and provide the capacity to address challenges
such as crime and terrorism, but no matter the intentions with which
governments initially acquire such technology, they can also use these
tools to muzzle and restrict the activities o their opponents.