Michael Kimmage
164 «¬® ̄°±² ³««³°® ́
impossibility o decent relations with the
West. This message can be delivered
through speeches and cultural diplomacy
directed at the Russian public—a form
o communication that high-level U.S.
politicians have long neglected—and
through a public willingness to engage in
a bilateral strategic dialogue Moscow, as
Washington regularly does with Beijing.
The familiar story o¤ Russian liberty
lost or unachieved—o which Between
Two Fires is a superb example—can help
inform a better U.S. approach to Russia.
But much more helpful would be the less
frequently told story o¤ Russian nation-
hood and o its development along lines
very dierent from those that led to
American or western European nation-
hood. In this time o¤ fervid preoccupa-
tion with Russia, that is not a narrative in
search o an audience. It is a narrative
in search o an author.∂have been engaged in geopolitical compe-
tition since 1945 (at least), with Moscow
having already once been a spectacular
loser in this contest. The American
superpower is the single greatest obstacle
to Russian autonomy. Consequently,
the United States has the potential to
inspire immense enmity in Russia, and
its ability to generate goodwill is highly
circumscribed. The Trump administra-
tion, which speaks a language o assertive
nationalism at home and abroad, has
allowed U.S.-Russian relations to dete-
riorate from the low point it inherited in
January 2017. Meanwhile, Donald
Trump’s Democratic opponents have
expressed horror at his slavish attery o
Putin but have failed to articulate a
coherent Russia strategy o their own.
In conceptualizing a workable ap-
proach to Russia, the ¥rst thing Ameri-
can policymakers should do is acknowl-
edge Russian nationhood as the key
factor in the post-Soviet world. Putin
has sought, with some success, to nudge
the international system away from the
ideals o democracy and sustained
multilateralism and toward the impera-
tives o national power, prestige, and
inuence. The goal o projecting autono-
mous nationhood outward will guide
Russian foreign policy long after Putin
chooses to retire or is pushed aside.
Washington can seek out ways o bend-
ing this Russian goal to U.S. interests by
stipulating redlines (such as ²³μ¬’s
inviolability and the integrity o the U.S.
democratic process), exploring potential
points o cooperation on counterterror-
ism and climate change, and signaling to
the Russian people that a European
security architecture and Russian nation-
hood are not mutually exclusive, what-
ever the Kremlin might say about the