Carter Malkasian
84 «¬® ̄°±² ³««³°® ́
for Strategic Studies found that only 11 percent o respondents had
joined the force speci¥cally to ¥ght the Taliban; most o them had
joined to serve their country or to earn a salary, motivations that did
not necessarily warrant ¥ghting, much less dying. Many interviewees
agreed with the claim that police “rank and ¥le are not convinced
that they are ¥ghting for a just cause.” There can be little doubt that
a far larger percentage o Taliban ¥ghters had joined the group spe-
ci¥cally to confront the United States and the Afghans who were
cooperating with the Americans.
This asymmetry in commitment explains why, at so many decisive
moments, Afghan security forces retreated without putting up much
o a ¥ght despite their numerical superiority and their having at least
an equal amount o ammunition and supplies. As a Taliban religious
scholar from Kandahar told me in January 2019, “The Taliban ¥ght for
belief, for jannat [heaven] and ghazi [killing in¥dels].... The army and
police ¥ght for money.... The Taliban are willing to lose their heads
to ¥ght.... How can the army and police compete with the Taliban?”
The Taliban had an edge in inspiration. Many Afghans were willing to
kill and be killed on behal o the Taliban. That made all the dierence.MISSION ACCOMPLISHED
These powerful factors have kept the United States and the Afghan
government from prevailing. But failure was not inevitable. The best
opportunities to succeed appeared early on, between 2001 and 2005.
The Taliban were in disarray. Popular support for the new Afghan
government was relatively high, as was patience with the foreign pres-
ence. Unfortunately, U.S. decisions during that time foreclosed paths
that might have avoided the years o war that followed.
The ¥rst mistake was the Bush administration’s decision to exclude
the Taliban from the postinvasion political settlement. Senior Taliban
leaders tried to negotiate a peace deal with Karzai in December 2001.
They were willing to lay down their arms and recognize Karzai as the
country’s legitimate leader. But U.S. Secretary o¤ Defense Donald
Rumsfeld shot down the deal—in a press conference, no less. After
that, between 2002 and 2004, Taliban leaders continued to reach out
to Karzai to ask to be allowed to participate in the political process.
Karzai brought up these overtures to U.S. o¾cials only to have the
Bush administration respond by banning negotiations with any top
Taliban ¥gures. In the end, the new government was established