203
The Phillips Curve shows
the correlation between
unemployment and the rate
of inflation. As unemployment
goes down, inflation goes up,
and vice versa.
See also: Depressions and unemployment 154–61 ■ The Keynesian multiplier 164–65 ■ Monetarist policy 196–201 ■
Rational expectations 244–47 ■ Sticky wages 303
POST-WAR ECONOMICS
could pick their preferred point
along the Phillips Curve, choosing
either low unemployment and high
inflation, or low inflation and high
unemployment, and adjust their
policies to suit. By increasing or
reducing their spending, and
tightening or slackening monetary
policy (the money supply and
interest rates), they could regulate
aggregate demand (total spending)
to fix the economy on the curve.
The economy was treated like a
giant machine. All major questions
about the macroeconomy—the
country’s whole economic
system—could seemingly be
reduced to technical fixes rather
than battles over ideology.
The curve fit well with the
Keynesian macroeconomics
(pp.154–61) that was prevalent at
the time. When unemployment was
high, it was assumed that the dip
in labor and product markets would
drag wages and prices downward.
Inflation would be low. When
employment was high, additional
demand in the economy—perhaps
from government spending—did not
increase output and employment,
but pulled prices and wages
upward. Inflation would rise.
However, by the 1970s this stable
relationship appeared to have
collapsed. Unemployment and
inflation rose together in a condition
known as “stagflation.” US economist
Milton Friedman (p.199) explained
it in a way that came to dominate
macroeconomic theory. He said
that as well as showing a
relationship between actual prices
and unemployment, the Phillips
Curve needed to take account of
expectations of inflation. People
realized that when the government
increased spending to boost the
economy (and raise employment),
inflation would surely follow.
Consequently, any increase in
government spending during
periods of high unemployment
was taken as a sign of impending
inflation, and workers asked for
wage increases before prices
actually rose. In the long run, said
Friedman, there is no trade-off
between unemployment and
inflation. The economy is fixed at
a “natural rate” of unemployment.
Government attempts to stabilize
the economy had merely pushed up
expectations of future inflation, and
actual inflation had risen as a result.
Friedman’s challenge cleared
the way for an assault on Keynesian
macroeconomics, and governments
turned to ways of improving the
supply of capital and labor, rather
than focusing their efforts on
regulating demand. ■
INFLATION (%)
Phillips Curve
Bill Phillips
Born in New Zealand in 1914,
Alban William Phillips moved to
Australia in his early twenties,
working for a time as a crocodile
hunter. He traveled to China in
1937, fled when the Japanese
invaded, and arrived in the UK
in 1938 to study engineering.
At the outbreak of World War II
Phillips joined the RAF.
Captured by the Japanese in
1942, he spent the rest of the
war in a prison camp. In 1947, he
took up sociology and enrolled
at the London School of
Economics, but switched to
economics at the post-graduate
level. He became a professor
there in 1958. In 1967, he moved
to Australia to teach but had a
stroke two years later and
retired to New Zealand.
Key works
1958 The Relationship Between
Unemployment and the Rate of
Change of Money Wages
1962 Employment, Inflation, and
Growth: An Inaugural Lecture
By 1931, unemployment in the US
had reached nearly 23 percent, with
a corresponding fall in prices. The
government launched a program of
public works to create jobs.
At zero inflation
unemployment
is high
UNEMPLOYMENT
0