The Philosophy Book

250 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Logic is not

a body of doctrine

but a mirror-image

of the world.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

might be related. Wittgenstein says
that language “pictures” the world.
He formulated this idea during
World War I, when he read in a
newspaper about a court case in
Paris. The case concerned a
car accident, and the events were
re-enacted for those present in
court using model cars and model
pedestrians to represent the cars
and pedestrians in the real world.
The model cars and the model
pedestrians were able to depict
their counterparts, because they
were related to each other in
exactly the same way as the real
cars and real pedestrians involved
in the accident. Similarly, all the
elements depicted on a map are
related to each other in exactly
the same way as they are in the
landscape that the map represents.
What a picture shares with that
which it is depicting, Wittgenstein
says, is a logical form.
It is important here to realize
that we are talking about logical
pictures, and not about visual
pictures. Wittgenstein presents a
useful example to show what he

means. The sound waves generated

by a performance of a symphony,

the score of that symphony, and the

pattern formed by the grooves on

a gramophone recording of the

symphony all share between them

the same logical form. Wittgenstein

states, “A picture is laid against

reality like a measure.” In this way

it can depict the world.

Of course, our picture may be

incorrect. It may not agree with

reality, for example, by appearing to

show that the elephant is not angry

when the elephant is, in fact, very

angry. There is no middle ground

here for Wittgenstein. Because he

starts with propositions that are,

by their very nature, true or false,

pictures also are either true or false.

Language and the world, then,

both have a logical form; and

language can speak about the

world by picturing the world, and

picturing it in a fashion that agrees

with reality. It is at this point that

Wittgenstein’s idea gets really

interesting, and it is here that we

can see why Wittgenstein is

interested in the limits of language.

Consider the following idea: “You

should give half of your salary to

charity.” This is not picturing

anything in the world in the sense

meant by Wittgenstein. What can

be said—what Wittgenstein calls

the “totality of true propositions”—

is merely the sum of all those

things that are the case, or the

natural sciences.

Discussion about religious and

ethical values is, for Wittgenstein,

strictly meaningless. Because the

things that we are attempting to

talk about when we discuss such

topics are beyond the limits of the

world, they also lie beyond the

limits of our language. Wittgenstein

writes, “It is clear that ethics cannot

be put into language.”

Beyond words

Some readers of Wittgenstein,

at this point, claim that he is a

champion of the sciences, driving

out vague concepts involved in talk

of ethics, religion, and the like. But

something more complex is going

on. Wittgenstein does not think

that the “problems of life” are

A digital image, although not the

same sort of object as the one it depicts,

has the same “logical form.” Words only

represent reality for Wittgenstein if,

again, both have the same logical form.