Revolution of the seventeenth century: the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition and the
mechanical philosophy. These two themes correspond to Henry’s “mathematical
and more pragmatic or experiential arts and sciences” and “natural philosophy,”
respectively. C ohen (2010a: 9) suggests that in addition to the two approaches
mentioned above, there is another mode of “nature-knowledge,” which Cohen
refers to as “an empiricist and practice-oriented form of experimental science.”
Although it is important to determine how this factor might affect the develop-
ment of biolinguistics, I will leave this problem open here. See C ohen (2010b)
for a more detailed recent historiographical characterization of the Scientifi c
Revolution. Cf. H enry (2008)
4 See also Pitt (1978) for discussion.
5 Chomsky (2000: 84) presents a different interpretation of the synthesis of math-
ematical description and mechanical philosophy Newton established:
Just as the mechanical philosophy appeared to be triumphant, it was demolished
by Newton, who reintroduced a kind of “occult” cause and quality, much to the
dismay of leading scientists of the day, and of Newton himself. The Cartesian
theory of mind (such as it was) was unaffected by his discoveries, but the theory
of body was demonstrated to be untenable. To put it differently, Newton elimi-
nated the problem of “the ghost in the machine” by exorcising the machine; the
ghost was unaffected.Although this discrepancy points to an important issue concerning the notion of
causality, which is worth careful discussion, I will leave it for future study.6 See Gardner (1985) for the notion of the Cognitive Revolution of the 1950s.
7 Bechtel (2008/ 2009: 2) notes as follows:
Here modern science has taken a different path, outdoing Descartes at his own
endeavor by fi nding mechanistic explanations for mental as well as bodily phenom-
ena. Cognitive scientists, and their predecessors and colleagues in such fi elds as
psychology and neuroscience, assume that the mind is a complex of mechanisms
that produce those phenomena we call “mental” or “psychological.”8 Mayr (2004: 25) comments upon the establishment of modern biology as follows:
The two-hundred-year period from about 1730 to 1930 witnessed a radical
change in the conceptual framework of biology. The period from 1828 to 1866
was particularly innovative. Within these 38 years, both branches of modern
biology – functional and evolutionary biology – were established. See Ma yr (2004)
for further discussion.9 Boeckx and Grohmann (2007) and Jenkins (2011) express a similar view.
References
Al-Mutairi, Fahad Rashed. 2014. The minimalist program: The nature and plausibility
of Chomsky’s biolinguistics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bechtel, William. 2008/2009. Mental mechanisms: philosophical perspecti ves on cog-
nitive neuroscience. New York and London: Psychology Press Taylor & Francis
Group.
184 Masanobu Ueda