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which was a courageous, blistering attack by CICI on the corruption that
plagued Nuri as-Said’s cabinet and government, that weakened national
security, and that doubtless impeded the DSO’s vital work. Authoritative
and blunt perhaps, but certainly not unduly pessimistic or misleading, the
CICI summary was doubtless well received by the wider intelligence com-
munity for whose eyes it was primarily intended, beyond the proxy schemes
and vested interests of the FO. It probably accurately reflected the view of
the Arab street too, where people were struggling with galloping inflation
and poverty for which Nuri Pasha’s ‘oligarchy of racketeers’ appeared to
have neither remedy nor concern.^48 Presumably Cornwallis hoped that
Jumbo Wilson would reprimand Wood and Dawson-Shepherd for releas-
ing the summary. If the general did so, it was never recorded.
The situation eased somewhat at the end of July 1943, around the time
of the Battle of Kursk, which hammered the penultimate nail into the
Germans’ coffin, when the SOE–PWE Policy Committee, established in
Cairo in February as a subcommittee of the Defence Committee,^49 decided
to wind up all postoccupational schemes in Iraq except the PLUM scheme.
Four of the six PLUM officers working with the Kurds had already been
transferred to the Balkans; now the remaining two could return to normal
duty. M.R. Lonsdale (who would be wounded and taken prisoner at the
Battle of Leros in November),^50 John Roberts (D/H.447), and Frank
Hoppé (D/H.227), who had been stationed at South Gate with 8 ORs,
coordinating postoccupational activities with PAIFORCE, were also
released.^51 In September 1943, in a letter to Glenconner written after the
evident turning point in the war brought about by the decisive Allied vic-
tories at the battles of El Alamein, Stalingrad, and Kursk, it was Pat
Domvile who addressed the question of whether SOE should continue to
operate in the Arab world. Pressure from the FO seems to have been
building to ‘parcel out’ SOE activities to other government departments;
Domvile protested strongly, asserting that many agents would not trust
themselves in the hands of other organizations. However, his main argu-
ment was that ‘SOE could do things that embassies and legations could
not do with propriety’ (whispering, oral propaganda, and bribery opera-
tions). The only awkward point was that most of the SOE ‘dirt boys’
would have to find new cover. Domvile was certain that, ‘as soon as the
screws now applied to normal political safety valves were lifted, there
would be a period meriting covert intervention to ease awkward situations
that would arise in the Arab countries.’^52 Domvile was absolutely realistic
about conditions on the ground. He realized that he might appear to be a