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records. In fact, they were of such quality that they were used extensively
not just by CICI and PAIFORCE personnel but also by security-cleared
embassy staff, and by such trusted external clients as Art Dayton (Office of
Strategic Services [OSS] chief agent), US legation diplomats, and the Iraqi
CID. When RAF ‘I’ Branch was absorbed by CICI in June 1941, its valu-
able records were taken over, providing a solid foundation for the future
carding of personalities. Some of the RAF records went back 15 years, and
by the end of the war, at least 80,000 persons had been carded (in a coun-
try with a total population of only 4,000,000). The card-index and filing
system adopted by the Baghdad records section was more or less the same
as that used by DSOs throughout the SIME organization. Personality files
were kept of suspects, as well as of prominent officials and notables beyond
reproach, and their profiles were built systematically. When a name was
mentioned in an incoming document (e.g. a letter or report) as being
suspect, and it was decided that further verification was necessary, the
name was carded, together with the reference number and date of the
document in which the name appeared. If the same name was then men-
tioned in further documents, the reference number of each document was
recorded on the card, until so many references appeared on the card that
the opening of a personality file became advisable. Largely because of the
vital, integral contribution made by his records section to the security of
Iraq, Chokra Wood always believed that security and politics dovetailed
into each other, and that the terms of the CICI charter, which drew a rigid
line of demarcation between security and political intelligence, were too
restrictive. Notwithstanding CICI’s clear remit under the charter, Wood
therefore insisted that the records section maintain political records in
addition to security profiles. His defiant attitude unquestionably enhanced
the function and value of the CICI registry. Occasionally, the political
records of the registry were expanded suddenly and unexpectedly by new
intelligence acquired when important targets were arrested and their
premises searched, yielding documents with high information content.
For instance, in lieu of actual arrest, when Yunis Sabawi fled the country
at the end of May 1941, his house was raided and searched. CICI officers
discovered a complete card index which included almost every important
person in Iraq regardless of nationality. The contents of the index were
‘interesting and illuminating,’ revealing hitherto unknown facts about the
true loyalties of prominent personalities, including tribal leaders.^27
At the core of the CICI registry, augmenting the static card index, was
a dynamic indexing system known as Movements of Foreign Agents
THE MOON PALACE