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of major or squadron leader, who were full members of CICI, endeav-
oured to maintain close and friendly relations with local government offi-
cials and personalities. By touring with regularity, ALOs also liaised closely
with all the tribal representatives in their areas and built up their own
agent networks. They were required to report routine information in writ-
ing on a weekly basis, but urgent intelligence could always be communi-
cated to HQ by telephone. Thus an up-to-date and complete picture of
provincial T&P affairs was always available. On the political side, the
Baghdad embassy was highly cooperative. Copies of all embassy despatches
and signals likely to interest CICI were provided, and at a weekly meeting
chaired by Cornwallis himself, members of all branches of British intelli-
gence were encouraged to discuss and criticize political events. These
transactional gatherings, which were clearly an extension of the genial
ambassador’s experience in diplomatic communication and negotiation,
greatly expanded the participants’ knowledge of British policy and its con-
sequences. This even included learning from Cornwallis about the out-
come of contacts between embassy officials and Iraqi statesmen, readily
disclosed to all present. Connaître les dessous des cartes (knowing what’s
what) was of course always CICI’s priority, but the information and
insights gained from these weekly meetings took things to a higher level,
greatly enhancing the T&P section’s ability to forecast political trends
with accuracy. Even so, on the tribal side, most of CICI’s work depended
on that of the ALOs, who collected valuable, extensive data. Feuds among
the tribes, as well as between the tribes and the central government, were
reported in detail. While ALOs were instructed to confine their activities
to observation and reporting—watching and writing—individual person-
alities were sometimes instrumental in the restraining of ebullient tribal
leaders and the substitution of negotiations for insurgency. Topographical
information gained while touring in tribal areas was immediately passed to
GHQ PAIFORCE, where it was processed and converted into maps for
further use by ALOs and PAs.
The political advisers and liaison officers in Iraq were divided into two
camps: the Arabists and the Kurdish experts. This division was acutely
defined. The two polarized canons of political opinion that were gener-
ated in the internal intelligence reports and appreciations submitted by
members of either camp were essentially as oppositional as the polarized
views of the Arabs and Kurds they observed. It therefore fell largely to the
ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, and the British adviser to the Iraqi
interior ministry, ‘CJ’ Edmonds, to act as the arbiters between the two
THE MOON PALACE