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and Tigris rivers. It is equally interesting to see how Glubb exhibited all
the skills and tradecraft of an experienced covert organizer, wise to the
ways of the secret world. He immediately realized that no groundwork for
an uprising had been done in Iraq. In any form of conspiracy, tribal revolts
included, considerable preliminary work was required to secure the adher-
ence of leaders, to form a network of cells around them, and to supply the
cells with equipment and arms. Glubb recognized that nothing like this
had been undertaken in Iraq; therefore, no instant revolt could be initi-
ated. He knew it would be necessary to start from scratch, to work very
fast, and to limit activity of the Arab Legion to one selected area. When
faced with a choice between northern and southern Iraq, Glubb decided
to focus on the former because of the presence of the Luftwaffe in Mosul,
because HABFORCE was advancing on Baghdad, and because the Regent
and his advisers favoured the idea. As soon as it was decided to concentrate
on guerrilla operations in the Jazirah, messengers were despatched to the
principal personalities in the area, from both Abdulillah and Glubb.
Meanwhile, however, it was decided that direct military action to establish
moral ascendancy in the area would be an important inducement for the
tribes to cooperate and would also speed things up. It was decided that the
severance of communications between Baghdad and Mosul up the Tigris
would form a suitable objective for the following reasons: (1) to hamper
or prevent Iraqi reinforcements or armaments travelling between Mosul
and Baghdad in either direction; (2) to create great alarm and despon-
dency among the Iraqis; (3) to interfere with trade and cripple the Iraqi
economy; (4) to raise the tribes by showing them that the British were
now on the offensive; and (5) to prevent Rashid Ali from escaping
to Mosul.^4
As a first step, on 23 May, an Arab Legion Desert Force detachment,
supported by sappers and two RAF armoured cars, cut the main railway
line at Istabulat (20.6 km south of Samarra). On their way back from the
raid, the Desert Force captured seven Iraqis, who yielded some extremely
useful intelligence. The next day saw a second detachment cut the main
line at Samarra, taking at least one prisoner. It was discovered that the
Istabulat raid had caused great consternation among the Iraqis because
they had no idea that British forces had crossed the Euphrates. Meanwhile,
Glubb continued his subversive activity among the Shammar of the
Jazirah, one of Iraq’s largest and most powerful tribes. It is at this point
that Glubb’s unconventional campaign came to its sudden, premature end
brought about by political, rather than military, events.^5
SIX: HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE