193
For his part, Bedaux planned to ‘sand-up’ (and subsequently ‘de-sand’)
not only the Abadan refinery, but also the Mosul oilfield, as well as the
483 km of pipeline between them, not to mention other oilfield infra-
structure that might be the target of Allied (or Axis) air raids. This would
have involved the application of highly complex, untested engineering
techniques and daunting military logistics, not to mention the local
recruitment of a large Arab labour force, all to be undertaken within a
matter of days after traversing the entire country from north to south. No
allowance seems to have been made for the presence of formidable num-
bers of British, Indian, and Free Polish forces defending the region. It was
a crazy idea, but the international super-salesman Bedaux somehow bam-
boozled the Nazis into giving it serious consideration. Under orders from
on high, the normally coolheaded Hans-Otto Wagner, the equally rational
Werner Eisenberg, and the Abw II OR planning staff began to elaborate a
detailed plan of execution in October 1941, with the autumn of 1942 as
their target date. However, it was not until a year later that Felmy’s troops
were actually transferred from Greece to southern Russia, probably (but
not necessarily) in preparation for Bedaux’s great raid. Of the many other
units needed there is no record, nor is there any indication of the neces-
sary technical resources having been assembled for the operation. Two or
three months later, of course, the collapse of the German Sixth Army at
Stalingrad negated Bedaux’s plan, and nothing more was heard about it,
certainly not from Wagner or Eisenberg, who were probably embarrassed
to have ever been associated with it.^41
(Narrative 5 [Abwehr]) Operation BASRA. Hans Fritze, a former ship-
ping agent in Basra, who as a Brandenburger corporal had formerly trained
the Abwehr’s Freikorps Iran (Persian Free Corps) in sabotage at Meseritz
(now Międzyrzecz, Poland), was designated to lead this operation. It is
not clear how many men were to participate or whether insertion was to
be by air or by sea. The targets were undoubtedly Basra, the Shatt al-Arab,
and Persian Gulf shipping, which was to be sabotaged and disrupted, and
possibly the oil installations at Abadan. Planning is believed to have been
undertaken in March 1943, at a time when Meseritz training personnel
like Fritze were anxious to avoid probable transfer to front-line combat
with the Brandenburgers on the Russian Front. Operation BASRA may
therefore have been little more than a make-work project. Not surprisingly
there is no record of execution.^42
(Narrative 6 [Abwehr/SKL]) Operation REISERNTE. The German
intelligence services and the German navy played a lengthy game of ‘pass
A PLACE IN THE SHADE