Iraq, President Bush dared Muslim extremists to “attack us there. My answer
is, bring them on.”^38 The extremists responded. Al Qaeda, which had no
presence in Iraq under Hussein, found Iraq under Bush fertile ground for
recruits.
This graph shows Iraq’s steady slide toward statelessness. Of course
statelessness was likely after the United States disbanded Iraq’s government
and armed forces.
To be sure, the war did not look as misguided or mishandled in 2004 as in
2007, so it is hardly fair for me to suggest that textbook authors should have
known then what is obvious now. However, for the most part I have
summarized criticisms levied by journalists, historians, and former government
officials between 2002 and 2004, before four of these books had gone to press.
Certainly by 2007, almost all historians and policy analysts—as well as a
majority of American citizens—concluded that the decision to wage war on
Iraq was a mistake. Today, Iraq, instead of being a secular (if undemocratic)
state, is moving toward statelessness, which breeds terrorism, or toward
fundamentalist Shi’ite control with expanded Iranian influence. Iran, unlike
Iraq, has sponsored terrorist groups in the Middle East, so its enhanced power
resulting from our intervention is hardly in our interest. Our military presence
as occupier generates ever-increasing resentment among Muslims everywhere,
which in turn helps terrorists solicit new members. Owing to internal sabotage,