Remarks on layering 281motivated by the conceptual properties of the qualifications they express.
But that is a matter of diachronic effects of meaning on form, and of syn-
chronic procedural links between forms and the basic conceptual
dimensions they express.
- Basic properties of the layered system in conceptualization
But then, if we try to model the layered system in conceptualization, can
the layered system postulated in FG not serve as a source of inspiration?
The foregoing already implies that the format of ‘entities’ in the FG system
cannot be taken over (i.e. lexical structures such as the predicate and argu-
ments, or the distinction between operators and satellites). Yet maybe the
semantic notions involved in the system and the principles of their organi-
zation could be maintained? In some respects the answer may be positive,
but in some other respects it appears to be negative. In the following I will
try to sketch what layering in conceptualization may involve, with refer-
ence to some of the major features of the layered system in FG.
4.1. The gradual nature of the layered system, and the rationale
behind it
The layered system in conceptualization is (unlike the FG system) most
probably a gradual system. This is apparent in observations regarding the
semantic scope effects that arise when combining different qualificational
expressions in an utterance: one can always determine a semantic domi-
nancy hierarchy between the qualifications involved, which is moreover
stable across various tokens of the combination. This is also true of qualifi-
cations which in the FG system are on one level, e.g. the predicational one.
The following examples are self-explanatory:7/8
(1) a. John went skiing a few times [quant. aspect] last year [time]
b. It happened last year that John went skiing a few times
c. It happened a few times that John went skiing last year
(2) a. John must [deontic modality] go skiing next year [time]
b. There is an obligation for John to go skiing next year
c. It will happen next year that John must/is obliged [at the time of
speaking] to go skiing
(3) a. John may [epistemic modality]^9 go skiing next year [time]
b. There is some kind of likelihood that John will go skiing next year
c. *It will happen next year that John may go skiing