with pre-70 Judaea, when the centripetal force of the Temple and the authority
of the high priesthood are likely to have secured calendrical unity. In this
complex, competitive situation, the intruders were clearly not the city coun-
cils—who could legitimately expect to control their calendar, as was the
privilege of all cities in the Hellenistic world—but rather the rabbinic courts.
In this respect, perhaps, rabbinic courts may have been viewed as the politi-
cally dissident party.^155 Their legitimacy is certainly likely to have been an
issue.^156
The rabbinic new moon procedureThis may explain a peculiar feature of the rabbinic new moon procedure, as it
is described especially in the Mishnah, which has been generally ignored in
modern scholarship: namely, its distinctlyjudicialcharacter. The rabbinic
body in charge of determining the new month is called in the Mishnah a
beit din(lit.‘house of judgment’), i.e. judicial court; its leader is‘head of the
beit din’(mRH2: 7). This court must be composed of three judges, like all
lower courts of law.^157 Its procedure is strictly judicial: as in all trials, the
verdict must be based on the testimony of two witnesses; even if the court itself
saw the new moon, two of its members must detach themselves from the court
in order to serve as witnesses (and if necessary, more judges must be co-opted
to the court to make up the quorum of three).^158 These witnesses need to be
legally valid, which excludes relatives of one another, slaves, women, and
people disqualified on various grounds of immorality.^159 As in all trials, the
witnesses must be interrogated separately by the court, to confirm the
(^155) On the complex relationship between rabbinic judiciary courts and city councils (which
also regularly acted as judiciary courts), see Z. Safrai (1995) 25, 77–88, 276–9, 300–1.
(^156) The need for legitimacy explains perhaps the claim, in rabbinic sources, that the rabbinic
court’s decisions to sanctify the month and intercalate the year were divinely sanctioned; see in
particularpKetubot1: 2 (25b) with parallels inpNedarim6: 13 (40a) andpSanh.1: 2 (19a) and
elucidation in Stern (2001) 231, and more explicitly in later sources (ExodusRabbah15: 2 and 15:
20,Pirqei de-Rabbi Eliezer8). According to a much-repeated tradition, God and his angelic court
would not sit in judgement on the New Year (1 Tishri) until the rabbinic court had sanctified it
and declared it thefirst day of the month:‘When the Court above see the Court below sanctifying
[the month], they sanctify it too’(pRH2: 6 (58b),pSanh.1: 2 (18c), and similarlypRH1: 3 (57b)).
For a much fuller development of this tradition,Pesiqta de-RavKahana5: 13, cited in Stern
(2001) 230; see also 157 tRH1: 12 (p. 209),bRH8b.
mSanh.1: 2. But the quorum for intercalation is disputed in this passage as well as in other
sources, and can be three,five, seven, or ten (seetSanh.2: 1,pSanh.1: 2 (18c),pH:agigah3: 1
(78d),bSanh.11a,LeviticusRabbah29: 4,Pirqei de-Rabbi Eliezer8,ExodusRabbah15: 20); see
Goodblatt (1998) 183–4.
(^158) mRH3: 1. As explained inpRH3: 1 (58d),pSanh.1: 2 (18c), andbRH25b–26a, this
follows the general judicial principle that‘a witness cannot become a judge’.
(^159) As listed inmRH1: 7–8. A similar list appears inmSanh. 3: 3–4, in connection with
normal judicial procedure.
Dissidence and Subversion 349