THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973strongest opponents of Israeli nuclearization were most concerned about the results
if Israel announced its possession of such weapons, or indeed even if the United States
made its concern about the issue public, which might “spark Soviet nuclear guaran-
tees to the Arabs, tighten the Soviet hold on the Arabs, and increase the danger of
US–Soviet nuclear confrontation.”^16 The latter warning was borne out in 1973, but
the Soviet nuclear guarantee was long since in effect when Kissinger’s paper was filed.
Returning from Moscow at the climax of the War of Attrition and Soviet involve-
ment in the summer of 1970, Nasser made an extraordinary public statement at his
party congress: “I am not sure whether conditions in the Middle East are ripe for a
nuclear war. However, as is well known we have signed the NPT and this treaty com-
mits the United States and the USSR to assist states that face nuclear danger.” Even
as he announced his acceptance of an American-brokered ceasefire, Nasser stressed
that for such support “I am not referring to the United States, which will help Israel.
But we will turn to the USSR and I have reason to believe that it will come to our
a i d .”^17 Nasser, then, had given up any aspiration toward acquiring nuclear weapons.^18
The Soviet guarantee was evidently still in effect: in the early spring of 1968, before
departing for a tour of duty in the eastern Mediterranean, the captain of submarine
K-172 was instructed to prepare a launch of eight SS-12 nuclear missiles at Israel if
the latter undertook “certain offensive action.”^19 The reiteration of this commitment
to Nasser in July 1968 was soon borne out overtly by the first visit of a Soviet nuclear
attack submarine, K-181, to an Eg yptian port.^20
It could hardly be expected that any Soviet concern about Israel’s nuclear prowess
would be imparted by politruks (political officers) to rank-and-file advisers, much less
to enlisted men of regular Soviet units—none of whom mention such instruction.
But it would have had to constitute a major strateg y factor at their command level—
for example, in 1968, Lashchenko or Malashenko—and there is no evidence that
their concept of an offensive into Sinai ever took the prospect of an Israeli nuclear
response into account. The interpreter Gorbunov who, after his stint with the Tu-16R
squadron and another on the canal front, served at the Eg yptian military academy
confirms that “what our generals never discussed in their lectures was that the Israeli
generals had nuclear weapons.” In 2013, he still wondered—or professed to wonder:
“Nasser may have known about the Israeli nuclear bomb. But did Moscow know
about it? And if it did know, why didn’t it say anything ?”^21
Previous studies have indeed noticed, in the 1967–73 period, “the decrease of
public Arab statements on the issue of Israel’s nuclear capability.” Several rationales
were suggested, mainly attributing the change to Arab weakness or resignation, but
the writers admitted that none were conclusive.^22 It now appears more likely that the
cause was less the deterrent effect of Israel establishing its nuclear clout as a fait accom-
pli than of its failure even to declare or test such arms—let alone use them—in the
darkest days of May–June 1967.^23 This demonstrated a lack of political will to invoke