The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

of decision that would be in his purview, as distinct from those to be determined by
the military on its own:

I can come in at the moment that the matter becomes one of principle [one line sanitized],

if they should be capable of attacking the Soviet Union ... or just the neighboring coun-

tries. I say: that’s already a question of concept, and I would want to share it with the cabi-

net and so on [three lines sanitized].^35

This appears to confirm Seymour Hersh’s unsourced claim that Dayan considered
Israel’s nuclear deterrence as aimed mainly toward the Soviets rather than the Arabs,
and that he took care to notify the Soviets so.^36 Knowing this Israeli posture would
have reinforced Soviet determination to keep a nuclear deterrent poised against Israel,
but need not have affected Moscow’s support for Arab offensive plans that could be
presumed insufficient to trigger a desperate Israeli move. The assumption whereby
Israel would be adequately reassured that its heartland was not at risk would prove
dangerously flawed in 1973, but for the time being it appears to have held.