THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973demand, Brezhnev stipulated that the consultation with a Soviet medical team be
held under total secrecy and be concealed even from others in the Soviet leadership.
Chazov and the specialists he assembled diagnosed atherosclerosis. When this was
reported to Brezhnev, the latter urged that “every effort be made to restore Nasser’s
health,” as “if he should leave the political scene it would be a major blow to our
interests and those of the Arabs.” No effort was spared to keep him on his feet—liter-
ally and figuratively. Chazov not only prescribed treatment at the Georgian spa
Tskhaltubo but went there himself to make the arrangements while Nasser flew home
via Yugoslavia (where Tito too reportedly lectured him on the inadvisability of pro-
voking the Israelis—for the time being ).
On 23 July 1968, Nasser, addressing the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) National
Congress, “was lavish in praise of Soviet assistance and generosity: ‘we took part of
the Soviet weapons as a gift and concluded a contract for the remainder, for which
we shall pay in the future in long term installments.’”^4 Once again, foreign interpreta-
tions, which are still echoed in Western historiography, had misread “not yet” as
“never” in Soviet advice to Eg ypt.^5
Chazov was waiting at Tskhaltubo when the Eg yptian president came there on
26 July, and attended him until Nasser departed on 17 August for an equal period of
recuperation at his villa near Alexandria.^6 Even before his return to Cairo, develop-
ments on the canal belied his purported dispute with the Soviets.
Israeli sigint monitors reported in August a “qualitative change in the Soviet pres-
ence in Eg ypt.” They may have picked up the signals of an electronic warfare (EW)
monitoring and jamming system with the permanent participation of a Soviet
spetsnaz (special forces) “radio-technical” outfit at a level commanded by a major; a
subsequent head of this unit dates its establishment to 1968.^7 The Israeli monitors
warned of a possible “unprecedentedly active Soviet intervention,” but were overruled
by the MI authorities who were empowered to disseminate such estimates.^8
B. Advisers prepare artillery duels and cross-canal raids
Anatoly Isaenko had returned from his service in the airlift of summer 1967 to com-
plete his studies at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, majoring in English.
In July 1968, after his graduation, he was again dispatched to Eg ypt and attached to
a SAM brigade that had been advanced to the canal front. He had to serve all five of
the brigade’s advisers and two more at division headquarters, so that “there was no
lack of work.” Within two weeks, he “got to tour the entire length of the front from
Port Said to Suez without meeting any misadventure.” But the quiet was misleading,
and Isaenko’s colleagues with the Eg yptian ground forces were privy to the Soviet role
in preparations for ending it.^9
Yury Gorbunov and others from his English-linguists group were transferred in
June 1968 from the Tu-16R squadron at Cairo-West (where they were replaced by