THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973In late August, two such raids killed three Israeli soldiers, captured one and set a
record for depth of penetration into Sinai.^12 An Eg yptian deserter told a news confer-
ence in Tel Aviv that at least one of these, on the night of 26 August, was carried out by
Karpov’s 118th Brigade. He confirmed the format of the Soviet presence: the advisers
still were not stationed permanently at battalion level, but made regular visits there.^13
The Soviets’ part in processing the raiders’ product into combat-useful data is illus-
trated by a Hebrew-language interpreter, Janis Sikstulis, who as his former classmate
Klimentov attests, took part in interrogating prisoners at the intelligence department
of II Army Corps headquarters.^14 Reminiscences of Israeli POWs bear this out: in
December 1969, a paratroop officer who was badly injured and captured in an ambush
east of the canal recalled “blue-eyed Russians” among the officers who crowded around
his stretcher after he was carried across. In February 1970, two Israeli operators of a
mobile canteen were captured by an Eg yptian raiding party that came “on four rubber
boats.” They were subjected to preliminary interrogation in a front-line bunker, in the
presence of “six big Russian guys” (as one of the prisoners retold it) or (according to the
other) “two Russians in the corner of the room ... with pale skin and blue eyes.” An IDF
paratrooper, captured in the major Eg yptian raid of 30 May 1970, was also taken for
interrogation “to a place where I saw some Russians.”^15
C. The guns of September: the Soviet role
It was under the Soviet advisers’ supervision, Klimentov writes, that the raiders’ data
was put to use when on the afternoon of 8 September 1968 Eg yptian artillery landed
a massive bombardment on Israeli positions. In contrast with previous local engage-
ments, this one encompassed nearly the entire length of the canal. Isaenko and “his”
SAM advisers were returning from an exercise on the coast south of Suez City when
sirens sounded. They just made it to headquarters in an old British-built bunker when
“‘the earth started rearing up’ all around. After an hour, Eg yptian 130mm guns
entered the fray, and then silence suddenly reigned.”^16 The Israelis charged that Eg ypt
had twice violated a UN-brokered truce and continued the cannonade, while the
Eg yptians boasted that Israel had “begged” for the ceasefire.
Despite admitting ten soldiers killed—a devastating loss by the Israelis’ standards—
they claimed that while “the Eg yptians fired more than 10,000 shells over three hours
and a half, this caused negligible damage to the IDF’s forward defense array.”^17 But the
Israelis were clearly outgunned, and their forward outposts on the canal had but flimsy
protection. Briefing a reporter after Israel constructed the strongpoints that would
become known as the Bar-Lev Line (for Chaim Bar-Lev, Rabin’s successor as IDF chief
of staff ), an Israeli colonel reckoned that “Soviet connivance and assistance” had
enabled the Eg yptians to reach an advantage of 25:1 in guns and 13:1 in manpower
along the canal before they launched their barrage. The Hebrew version of this inter-
view added, apologetically, that this Soviet assistance had been “clandestine.”^18