FACING THE BAR-LEV LINEtherefore leaked his meeting.”^38 In October 1971, the Soviet delegate of the moment
for secret feelers toward Israel, Primakov, still complained that the Semenov–Teko’a
meeting “within a few days was leaked to the Israeli press. I don’t mean to say that
Teko’a is not a decent man, but this leak ... burdened our relationship.”^39 Teko’a, for
his part, was not much impressed with Semenov’s supposed moderation, and began
his report with the Soviet’s warning that “Israel is liable to exacerbate the USSR’s
attitude.”^40 What stuck in the Israelis’ mind was a thinly veiled threat: “Israel may
regard Eg ypt as a backward country in military terms, but the USSR is not backward
and knows how to use weapons.”^41 No Soviet–Israeli rapprochement resulted, the
Jarring mission went nowhere and the Phantom deal went through.
In a Knesset statement, Allon held there was “no use in guesswork under what
circumstances the USSR might attack Israel with its own forces,” as so far this had
been done nowhere outside the Warsaw Pact. In any event, “Israel would not stand
alone as the United States would stand up for us.”^42 But even before the 26 October
flare-up, Israeli commentator Chaim Herzog had dismissed as moot the question
“Soviet Intervention in Our Region—Yes or No?” The intervention—he stated—was
already in progress, and its expansion might not necessarily ensure a US response:
It would be a mistake today, after the events in Czechoslovakia and in view of the
increasingly obvious Russian military psychosis, to state that there is no risk of Soviet
intervention in the Middle East. ... True, the USSR has no interest in a confrontation
with the West ... [but] the USSR already has intervened in the Middle East and is still
doing so. Further intervention may come in various forms, such as posting naval vessels
in certain areas, or stationing forces on or along the canal, on the assumption that the
IDF will be afraid to respond.^43