THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973[giving ] examples from the successful operation of Chinese, Korean or Vietnamese forces
armed with Soviet weapons and equipment against the US Army. In everyday life it is sad
and ridiculous to observe how under the tracks of a tank stuck in the sand, the crew clears
it away with their bare hands. In the machine’s kit there are no shovels ... not even a [tow-
ing ] cable.
For a year and four months we have not managed to get, from the officers of the division’s
operations department, any independent development of plans for tactical training or staff
exercises. ... The department’s deputy commander declared that we will have to keep on
preparing such papers for them. [Afanas’ev] explained to him in “popular” language ... that
we were here temporarily. To me, Pavel Aleksandrovich said we should draw up one more
plan for tactical training at the brigade level, but afterward they should do everything.The plan was drafted, scheduled for 8 April, and training exercises proceeded
despite the continued fighting. Serkov conceded grudgingly, “I would have graded
the soldiers 5 [out of 5] for diligence, the officers 3-minus. ... More practical training
is needed and less talk.” Still, “we prepare such training carefully and the results are
noticeable.” A month after daily hostilities began, “even a copying table was set up at
the operations department. ... This is our first victory. ... A good draftsman was trans-
ferred to the department—our second triumph.” And yet “it is early to speak of a
victorious war. They can carry out a single tactical operation, but only if their forces
are reliably covered against the enemy’s air force. This is the Eg yptians’ Achilles heel.”
He would soon be proved right.