The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

Dr Chazov relates that he took a “vacation” in Eg ypt “several months” after Nasser
left Tskhaltubo in August 1968, and found him “feeling well, walking a lot and even
playing tennis.” Nasser repeatedly put off another trip to take the Georgian waters,
but an Arab summit in early September 1969 “exhausted him.” On 10 September,
then-KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov informed Chazov that Brezhnev had received
a request from Cairo to send the doctor there urgently and in strict confidence (as it
turned out, this was at the suggestion of Sadat and Heikal).
Andropov estimated that the arrival of a special plane would draw the attention of
Israeli intelligence “which operated well in Cairo.” So Chazov, in shades and hat, was
put on an Aeroflot flight, sharing the entire first class cabin with a single military
adviser. Within twenty minutes of arrival he was rushed to Nasser, who on the 10th
had felt weakness and chest pain. Chazov could only confirm the Eg yptian doctors’
findings: symptoms of myocardial infarction—a heart attack.
Nasser would not hear of resting for a month or longer, which (he feared) might
disrupt the rehabilitation of his military. They settled on an initial ten days of rest
and medication, during which Chazov was cloistered in a cordoned-off section of
Shepheard’s Hotel except for daily house calls after dark. His presence was success-
fully concealed: no Soviet physician was named among the three doctors that the
foreign press reported as treating Nasser. It was at Chazov’s suggestion that the
medical bulletins stated Nasser had caught the flu “which was going around in
Cairo”; this euphemism had been used frequently for Soviet and other communist
leaders. Heikal and other Eg yptian flacks perpetuated the flu story, extending it as
far as January, and it became firmly established as fact even though Nasser never
actually contracted the disease.
As his patient improved, Chazov relates, their nightly talks extended beyond mere
medical matters:

At the end of the visit, when he gave me a personal letter for Brezhnev ... I understood that

Nasser was dissatisfied with the supply of outdated weapons, that he needed SAM-3s

instead of SAM-2s, and MiG-25s to cover Eg yptian skies, and to train an adequate number

of Eg yptian military experts in the USSR.^ He spoke of Israel’s impending attack and of

Alexandria’s vulnerability. All this was stated indirectly and diplomatically.^6

The defense of Alexandria, for instance, was brought up by suggesting that Chazov
should take a seaside break there, which he accepted. But the message he relayed is
yet another proof that the main element of Kavkaz was at least under discussion no
later than mid-September. Even if Nasser did go to Moscow in December or January,
the visit’s purpose and outcome was at most to accelerate the Soviet intervention that
had already been undertaken.
After Nasser’s agreed ten days of rest, Chazov flew home concerned that his
patient would not maintain the prescribed regimen, and indeed a week later the