FOREWORDxv
terland, which began on 7 January 1970. Specifically, the Soviet intervention was
requested by Nasser during an urgent, secret visit to Moscow later that month,
and granted only then by the Soviet leadership. We will show that the Soviet com-
mitment preceded this Israeli move, and that Nasser’s visit—if it took place at
all—at most accelerated its implementation. The direct Soviet military interven-
tion developed as a Soviet initiative; its peak extent was decided upon and set in
motion during the summer of 1969 at the latest, following smaller precedents that
began immediately after Eg ypt’s 1967 defeat.• The Soviet expeditionary force, using the USSR’s most advanced and sometimes
still-experimental systems, was highly successful in countering Israel’s US-supplied
weaponry. Contrary to the legend fostered by Israeli claims that the ceasefire of
August 1970 represented a striking victory over Soviet as well as Eg yptian forces,
it was actually imposed upon Israel by the superiority of Soviet arms, the unsus-
tainable human and material losses they caused to the Israelis, and the deterrent
effect of the Soviet presence.• Israel—and the United States—were therefore incapable of challenging the cease-
fire’s immediate and continuing violation by the Soviets and Eg yptians in advanc-
ing the air defense system to the bank of the Suez Canal. This created an essential
precondition for the Eg yptian offensive across the canal in 1973.• The hitherto unquestioned notion of an “expulsion of Soviet advisers” by Eg ypt in
1972, because of a rift between Cairo and Moscow, was certainly erroneous and
most probably the result of a deliberate deception. What occurred was in fact a
withdrawal of the integral Soviet formations, which was agreed not only between
the USSR and Eg ypt but also with the United States. The advisers attached to
Eg yptian units continued to play a vital role in preparations for the canal crossing.
Supply of Soviet offensive weapons—the denial of which was purportedly a cause
of the rupture—also went on unabated.• While tensions existed between Cairo and Moscow before the 1973 war, the USSR
was party to determining the date and operational outline of the Eg yptian–Syrian
onslaught on 6 October, and the Arab side enjoyed full Soviet support through-
out the hostilities as well as limited Soviet military involvement.In sum, we found the Soviet input at all these junctures to have been proactive,
purposeful and even aggressive in encouraging and supporting Eg ypt’s military chal-
lenge to Israel, rather than a moderating and restraining influence as it was almost
universally characterized. It was assumed that Moscow held back any Eg yptian offen-
sive out of preference for a political settlement and reluctance to risk a clash with the
United States. The Soviets, it was held, kept fostering Arab military aspirations in
order to preserve their regional standing, but always intended to block the fulfilment
of these aspirations so as not to harm the USSR’s global interests and its declared
détente policy.