THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973A typical story is that of Aleksandr Pechenkin, who was conscripted in May 1969
and sent to Baku for training in air-defense radio technolog y. In December, shortly
after he finished the course, “rumors spread that ‘volunteers’ were being selected for
service ‘overseas.’ ... All the zenitchiks [anti-aircraft weapons operators] had their
photos taken for special documents, and later it turned out that a divizyon was being
assembled in each Air Defense district.”^7 Sent back to Baku, Pechenkin and his com-
rades were joined by “mysterious Arabs” to train for cooperation. Their SAM-3 outfit
was later augmented with Shilka and Strela crews. After live-fire exercises, they loaded
their hardware onto a train for an undisclosed destination, but were informed on the
way by a railroad worker that they were going to Nikolaev, and that “you’re not the
first shipment going there, nor the last.” At the closed Black Sea port, they spent three
days loading the gear onto a freighter; after sailing, though dressed in civvies, they
were kept below deck except “when they needed the heads.” Surprised by the luxury
of several long movie screenings in the ship’s hold, Pechenkin was told that this was
intended to discourage the men from going topside while their ship went through the
Turkish straits.^8
B. A new airlift
The Soviet fighter squadrons that had been readied since August were finally dis-
patched to Eg ypt following the December talks, and so arrived before the SAM
division’s deployment was complete. The MiG-21s were dismantled and flown to
Eg ypt, in An-12 transport planes as in the 1967 airlift—but this time, together with
a full complement of pilots and ground crew, “after a hasty farewell from their fami-
lies.” Despite the lengthy preparations, the squadrons’ actual dispatch was mounted
hurriedly, or staged to appear so even to the Soviet rank-and-file. “Suddenly, on the
double, we had to repaint the [transport] aircraft—or rather, their identification
marks,” relates a flight engineer. “Over the [military] stars and aircraft numbers we
painted the emblem of Aeroflot and the national flag.”^9 There were, however, some
marked changes from the 1967 airlift. According to Evgeny Poluektov, this time the
civilian disguise was so perfunctory that the transports’ tail turret was not removed,
and its gun was brandished to ward off US carrier-based planes that approached his
An-12 en route. Likewise, the disassembled MiG-21s were not crated, and the fuse-
lage merely rested on blocks.
Poluektov was one of an entire class at the military language school who were
pressed into service for this massive operation—a takeoff every thirty minutes—
before completing their studies. Again, their main function was to handle English
communications with Italian and Greek, as well as Eg yptian, air traffic controllers.
But this time the Yugoslav controllers at Dubrovnik also refused to speak Russian.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had put them on edge, fearing that the sup-
posedly civilian An-12s might be used to ferry an airborne landing.^10