FOREWORDxvii
C. Obviating the need for harmonization
It may ... be better to disregard those patterns of behavior which Western Sovietologists have
invented and in which they have sought to confine the fluidity of Soviet foreign policy.
James Cable, 1971^12When the most glaring instances of Soviet support for, and participation in, Eg yptian
offensive initiatives appeared to contradict the prevailing concepts of Kremlin mod-
eration, this was described most honestly as “a puzzling pattern” or “contradictions
in Soviet strateg y” that had to be “minimized.”^13 But most Western scholarship
tended to paper over the inconsistency with such formulations as “Soviet policy was
dualistic ... providing the wherewithal for hostilities while nonetheless urging the
Arabs to forego their war plans.”^14 Other glosses reached near-Orwellian propor-
tions: “escalated Soviet military involvement need not be interpreted as incompatible
with a peace-seeking strateg y.”^15 When all else failed, resort was made to what might
be called adverbial harmonization: the Soviets did what they did reluctantly, or (after
a desperate reach for the thesaurus?) “adventitiously.”^16
Even the study of the War of Attrition that was rightly considered definitive waf-
fled: “Soviet policy ... was a curious mixture of adventurism and prudence.” But the
author, David Korn, did touch the nub of the issue: “not that they had strong objec-
tions in principle to another war; their main concern was that Eg ypt not launch itself
into one prematurely.”^17 Indeed, we found that this was the Soviets’ perennial argu-
ment for “restraint”: that the Eg yptian military was not yet ready. This was not an
excuse for temporizing ; constant and often costly tests were made by probing the
envelope both of Eg yptian capability and of Israeli or US response. When these
proved to be ripe—first for various stages in the War of Attrition, then for launching
the Yom Kippur War—the Kremlin gave its approval and support. In many of the
cases that we explored, the Soviets actually exhorted their advisees to more aggressive,
courageous and decisive action—and set personal examples.
The Kremlinolog y approach of the Cold War era left a lasting mark by ascribing
the perceived contradictions between Soviet policy and practice to rivalries within
the Soviet leadership: hawks v. doves, conservatives v. reformers, military v. civilian,
in addition to shifting personal cliques. In contrast, we found that Soviet operations
on the ground were on the whole consistent, purposeful and single-minded. Debates
and struggles may have occurred in Moscow, but as the Soviet diplomat and propa-
gandist Leonid Zamyatin put it, “major foreign policy initiatives always required
something of a consensus in the Politburo. Without one, there would be no deci-
sion.”^18 Once such consensus was reached or imposed, its implementation in the field
was unequivocal.
The Middle Eastern intervention, before and during the period under examina-
tion, did coincide with—indeed, both exemplified and facilitated—the consolidation
of CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s supremacy in the Soviet power struc-