THE SOVIET REGULARS MOVE INtaken responsibility for first exposing him—concluded in his latest assessment: “If
Marwan was planted by the Eg yptians to fool the Israelis, then he did his job
extremely well”—in respect of the Soviet involvement.^80
In European capital cities, Israeli diplomats received similar tips about a visit by
Nasser to Moscow in January, which were notably numerous and uniform for mutu-
ally unrelated intercepts of a genuinely guarded secret.^81 Within a few days, it was
firmly—if not yet unquestionably—established in Western perceptions, even though
it was denied by both officials in Cairo and the Eg yptian embassy in Moscow, and no
comment at all was forthcoming from the Soviets. Alvin Rubinstein’s observation in
1975 that “the trip has never been discussed in any Soviet source,” still holds true in
respect of official documents.^82 The same applies to US documents after the Sisco–
Rabin exchange: following a report by the US ambassador in Moscow Jacob Beam on
a talk with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 11 February, Kissinger estimated to
Nixon that the Soviets “may already have made some new commitment” to Eg ypt but
made no mention of a visit by Nasser.^83 In a 1978 memoir, Beam himself accepted the
version that “Israel’s deep bombing raids in Eg ypt ... invited the Soviets to interpose
their own force,” but still made no mention of Nasser’s arrival in the Soviet capital
despite the information that Sisco had received about it.^84
The leaks about Nasser’s visit, true or false, provided background and justification
when Kosygin wrote to Nixon (as well as the leaders of Britain and France) that “if
Israel continues its adventurism to bomb the territory of the UAR and other Arab
states, the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at
their disposal with the help of which due rebuff to the arrogant aggressor could be
made.” Richard Parker attests that “the almost universal reaction among the Soviet
specialists in the Department of State and the CIA was that the Soviets were bluffing
and would not in fact go beyond supplying more equipment to Eg ypt.”^85
Kissinger’s National Security Council (NSC) deputy Helmut Sonnenfeldt dis-
cerned “an emotional reaction to the killing of Soviet officers.” Based on the intercept
of the Brezhnev–Grechko talk, he suggested (correctly, but for the wrong reasons)
that the general secretary was personally involved in drafting the premier’s letter.
Sonnenfeldt headlined a memo to Nixon, which he drafted for Kissinger, with the
assessment that Kosygin’s message was “an inept performance.”
Sonnenfeldt was a veteran State Department Kremlinologist who was trans-
ferred to the NSC at Kissinger’s request. Typically, his main concern was that, in
Moscow, the Middle East situation would again be “used by a rebellious faction in
an indictment against the present leaders,” who in turn might “do something brave
to recoup.” Still, Sonnenfeldt did not foresee—nor did Kissinger—that the Soviets
would do more than “merely sending more equipment, [which] even if it is more
advanced is unlikely to accomplish anything.”^86 Given this US attitude, it is hardly
surprising that Israeli accounts claim there had been at least tacit or even “indi-