OPERATION KAVKAZ IS FORMALLY ORGANIZEDwardly maintaining his hard line. Therefore, informing the Americans confidentially
about “the possibility of our pilots appearing in the UAR” might be the best way to
press Nixon, since sending American pilots to Israel in response would be politically
untenable (the obvious reason why the Soviets and Eg yptians would repeatedly com-
plain that this was being done). “We are playing a new political card,” Dobrynin
wrote.^11 But Moscow evidently preferred operational secrecy to diplomatic pressure.
This recommendation of Dobrynin’s was not adopted, and if Kissinger thought the
Soviets were more candid with him than with Rogers or Sisco, he was in for a shock.
C. Stretching Soviet logistics and maintaining secrecy
The Soviet expeditionary force’s command structure was formally incorporated only
after Heikal’s version about its origin had been propagated. Air Force Colonel
Abramov dates the formal organization of the “Kavkaz operational group” on
30 January “by order of the Defense Minister.” It was headed by Lt-Gen. Sergey
Krivoplyasov, whose investigative mission to Eg ypt in 1968 the advisers had ridi-
culed. He is never mentioned as reaching Eg ypt with the Kavkaz formations, but ran
the operation’s rear headquarters in Moscow, bypassing standard channels with direct
reports to Defense Minister Grechko and Chief of Staff Zakharov. Officers who were
tapped to represent the various services in this combined outfit were forbidden to
inform their formal commanders about its activities, even when these pertained to
their own services. Abramov recalls the resentment of his Air Force superior, Lt-Gen.
(and twice HSU) Pavel Taran, when he was denied such information, and an ensuing
row with Krivoplyasov. The latter cited orders from Grechko and warned that even
if Abramov were replaced, his successor would be bound by the same strictures.
Conversely, Kavkaz staff officers were referred directly to top-level political figures
when the latter’s authorization was required for specific moves. They were generally
“received cordially, with understanding for our requests.” The exception was the mili-
tary’s own Political Command (Glavpur), which “considered itself an imperium in
imperio responsible only to the Central Committee.” Abramov derisively relates the
top politruks’ demands that the Soviets in Eg ypt uphold and spread Marxist–Leninist
doctrine, while Kavkaz chiefs stressed the need to understand and allow for Islamic
custom and the military constraints of confrontation with Israel. “We never found
common ground on this.”^12 But experience in the field soon changed the outlook of
many political officers.
In Moscow, Kavkaz staffers “were quartered separately next to the central command
post and were issued the latest signal equipment that enabled direct communication
with Cairo. The overload on the group’s officers was boundless. The working day was
unlimited. Every task had to be accomplished ‘by [the next] morning.’” Abramov him-
self had been attached to the group to replace this regimen’s first heart-attack victim.