THE SOVIET–ISRAELI BATTLE IS JOINEDunheeded intercept that forewarned of the Soviet squadrons’ arrival occurred before
Masregah’s formal organization).
Then, on 18 April, a pair of Phantoms was sent again on a deep-penetration sor-
tie—but for reconnaissance rather than bombing : the mission was to monitor
Eg yptian canal-crossing exercises in the hinterland (presumably Wadi Natrun). The
lead pilot (and second F-4 squadron commander) Avihu Bin-Nun let his subordinate
take the lead to gain practice, and the latter flew back slower than the planned 600
knots in order to conserve fuel, eliminate the refueling stop at Refidim, and return
earlier to home base in northern Israel. This permitted Soviet pilots to overtake them.
“They were right over us,” Bin-Nun related. “Apparently they didn’t spot us because
of the cloud shadows ... We got out of there without even seeing them. When we got
back, we first understood there were Soviet combat pilots in the region.”
The Masregah eavesdroppers—as retold by one of them, identified only as Lt-Col.
David—noticed the difference in tone and style between the new pilots’ signals and
those of the veteran advisers. “The discovery was so astonishing that a three-hour
shouting match ensued with Tovia [Feinman, the unit’s commander].” After initially
responding to this “nonsense” with some Russian obscenities, Feinman was per-
suaded, and sent a helicopter to pick up the tapes. That very evening they were deliv-
ered to Prime Minister Meir, who presented them to Nixon, correctly claiming that
“no one but us had spotted the transfer of Soviet forces to Eg ypt.”^10
The Soviets gave a different explanation of the first encounters’ indecisive
outcome. According to Colonel Konstantin Korotyuk, one of the MiG-21 regiment
commanders,
to stop the Israelis from striking at Eg yptian targets ... our fighters had to take off when any
Israeli aircraft which had been discovered were still at least 200km away. ... By the time the
latter had penetrated 30 to 40km inside Eg yptian territory our fighters would be 25 to
30km from them, but at that point the enemy turned away and headed home. We were
only allowed to pursue them as far as the Suez Canal but not to cross it.This, said Korotyuk, recurred daily with as many as five such interception sorties.
His colleague Nastenko added:
we were in a constant state of stress and our nerves were frayed to the limits. ... The pilots
would be sitting in ... their fighters which were standing in the shelters ... wearing partially
pressurized high altitude suits, and there was not even the slightest breeze into the shelters.
It was often over 40 degrees centigrade outside, and waiting for sorties like this often took
many hours.As such constant stress exhausted the pilots and slowed up their reactions, they
were ordered to do a full sequence of aerobatics before landing at the end of each
sortie, as well as mock dogfights.^11